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When Trial Advocacy Crosses the Line: Improper Argument, Expert Attacks, Preservation, and New Trials in Florida Civil Cases

By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

September 24, 2026

Florida trial lawyers are given considerable latitude to advocate for their clients. They may attack weaknesses in the opposing party’s evidence, expose bias, challenge an expert’s methodology, argue reasonable inferences from the record, and explain why a witness should or should not be believed. A jury trial is an adversarial proceeding, not an academic seminar, and effective advocacy is not required to be timid.

But there are limits.

Florida appellate courts have repeatedly addressed arguments and testimony that stray beyond the evidence, appeal improperly to prejudice or sympathy, attack opposing counsel personally, invite jurors to decide a case based on the relative wealth of the parties, or turn competing expert testimony into personal attacks on the credibility or professional competence of another expert. Even when misconduct occurs, however, that does not necessarily mean the verdict will be set aside. Florida law draws an important distinction between conduct that is improper and conduct sufficiently prejudicial to require another trial.

That distinction has substantial practical importance. A lawyer can cross the line without obtaining a new trial for the opposing party. Conversely, seemingly brief comments can become reversible error when they strike at a central issue, are repeated, evade effective correction, or combine with other errors to undermine confidence in the verdict.

The modern Florida cases therefore require courts to ask more than whether something improper occurred. They require consideration of what happened, when it happened, whether an objection was made, whether the trial judge had an opportunity to cure the problem, how important the issue was to the case, and whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.

Closing Argument Is Broad, But It Is Not Unlimited

The basic rule is straightforward. Closing argument exists to help the jury apply the evidence to the governing law. Lawyers ordinarily receive substantial latitude to discuss the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. But argument must remain tethered to the record.

The Florida Supreme Court articulated important limits in Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000). Counsel may not use closing argument to inject facts that are not in evidence or inflame the jury so that its verdict reflects passion or prejudice rather than a rational evaluation of the evidence. The same principle is reflected in Rule 4-3.4(e) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, which prohibits a lawyer at trial from alluding to matters the lawyer does not reasonably believe are relevant or supported by admissible evidence, asserting personal knowledge of facts in issue except while testifying, or stating a personal opinion as to matters including a witness’s credibility or the culpability of a civil litigant.

The distinction between argument and testimony is important. Counsel may argue, based on identified evidence, that a witness has a financial incentive, gave inconsistent testimony, ignored important information, or used an unreliable methodology. Counsel may not simply substitute counsel’s own credibility for the evidence by telling the jury, in substance, “I know this witness is lying” or “I know my client is telling the truth.”

Nor may closing argument become an independent source of evidence. The lawyer’s task is to explain the evidence the jury heard, not supplement it with facts the lawyer wishes the jury had heard.

Closing Argument Must Operate Within the Evidentiary Record

The Fourth District’s recent decision in Velez Rivera v. Lopes, No. 4D2025-0675 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 2, 2026), provides a useful illustration of another boundary in closing argument.

A medical record contained a statement assigning the plaintiff a permanent impairment rating, but the trial court properly excluded that portion of the record as hearsay. During closing argument, defense counsel emphasized the absence of admissible evidence from that medical provider establishing permanency. The plaintiff argued that the defense was improperly exploiting the exclusion because the unredacted record in fact contained such an opinion.

The Fourth District distinguished earlier cases in which a party obtained an erroneous exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence and then compounded the error by emphasizing the absence of that evidence to the jury. The court explained that those cases do not establish a rule prohibiting counsel from pointing out the absence of evidence that has been properly excluded. Properly excluded evidence is not part of the evidentiary record upon which the jury may decide the case.

The court nevertheless drew an important linguistic distinction. Defense counsel had stated at one point that no one at the medical facility had “ever rendered an opinion” that the plaintiff sustained a permanent injury. Literally, that statement was inaccurate: such an opinion had been rendered, but it had been excluded from evidence as hearsay. The Fourth District therefore did not entirely approve of counsel’s phrasing. It concluded, however, that any imprecision was harmless and did not create a reasonable possibility of affecting the verdict.

Velez Rivera thus illustrates two related principles. Counsel may argue from the absence of evidence that was properly excluded, because the jury’s decision must be based on the evidence actually admitted at trial. But counsel should describe that absence accurately. There is a difference between arguing that no admissible evidence establishes a fact and asserting that no such evidence or opinion ever existed.

Preservation Often Determines the Governing Standard

Perhaps the most important practical lesson in this entire area is that preservation matters.

Florida law treats preserved and unpreserved trial misconduct differently. If counsel objects contemporaneously and the trial court permits prejudicially improper argument or testimony, ordinary harmless-error principles may apply on appellate review. Under Special v. West Boca Medical Center, 160 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 2014), the beneficiary of preserved error bears the burden of establishing that there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict.

That is a materially different posture from a case in which counsel says nothing when the misconduct occurs.

In Murphy, the Florida Supreme Court established an intentionally demanding test for obtaining a new trial in a civil case based upon improper but unobjected-to closing argument. The complaining party must establish that the argument was improper, harmful, incurable, and so damaging to the fairness of the proceeding that the public’s interest in the justice system requires a new trial. Murphy, 766 So. 2d at 1028-31.

The failure to object therefore does considerably more than merely create an appellate technicality. It changes the substantive burden.

Florida law nevertheless recognizes that trial lawyers sometimes make a reasonable tactical decision not to object. Repeated objections during an opponent’s closing argument can themselves be counterproductive. But Murphy makes clear that counsel who remains silent takes a substantial risk. Moreover, even allegedly fundamental improper argument must be presented to the trial court in a motion for new trial before it can become the basis for appellate relief.

The better trial practice is therefore to consider preservation in real time. If an argument is sufficiently serious that counsel may later contend it deprived the client of a fair trial, counsel ordinarily should make a contemporaneous objection, obtain a ruling, request an appropriate curative instruction if one can work, and move for mistrial when the circumstances require it.

A sustained objection alone may not preserve every form of relief. That problem appeared in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Medina, 300 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). There, the trial court sustained an objection to an expert’s improper comment about an opposing expert, but the plaintiff did not move for mistrial. The Fourth District consequently treated the matter as unpreserved for the relief later sought.

Trial lawyers therefore have to think beyond obtaining the favorable word “sustained.” The question is what relief counsel believes the misconduct requires and whether that relief has actually been requested.

An Improper Comment Does Not Automatically Require a New Trial

Medina remains a useful case because it illustrates how Florida appellate courts separate impropriety from prejudice.

The case arose from an automobile accident in which the plaintiff alleged permanent lumbar injuries. The jury returned a defense verdict on causation. The trial court later granted the plaintiff a new trial based on the cumulative effect of four matters: a comment by a defense medical expert concerning plaintiff’s counsel, the expert’s statement criticizing another expert’s conclusion, a question concerning whether the plaintiff had retained counsel before seeking treatment, and defense counsel’s reference to State Farm as the “big guy” during closing argument.

The Fourth District reversed.

That result did not mean that everything occurring at trial was proper. The appellate court expressly recognized impropriety in portions of the testimony. But a new trial is not a disciplinary sanction imposed whenever a lawyer or witness misbehaves. Its purpose is to remedy a proceeding whose fairness has been materially compromised.

For example, during aggressive cross-examination concerning the amount of money the defense expert had earned from litigation work, the expert responded that he was not plaintiff’s counsel and did not give opinions based on money. State Farm conceded on appeal that the remark was inappropriate.

The Fourth District nevertheless concluded that the isolated comment did not deprive the plaintiff of a fair trial. It occurred once, was not repeated, and arose during contentious questioning directed toward the expert’s own financial interests. The trial court also offered a curative instruction, which plaintiff’s counsel declined.

That context mattered.

Florida courts have long condemned personal attacks on opposing counsel. Lawyers are not witnesses, and accusations that opposing counsel fabricated evidence, suborned false testimony, manipulated witnesses, or otherwise acted dishonestly can inject collateral issues into the case and improperly place counsel’s character before the jury. Similar concerns apply when a witness rather than a lawyer launches the attack.

But Florida appellate courts do not apply an automatic-reversal rule every time such a remark occurs. Frequency, severity, context, whether the comment was invited or provoked, whether an objection was made, the availability of a curative instruction, and the strength of the remaining evidence can all affect the analysis.

The distinction can sometimes be frustrating because two statements that look similar in isolation may produce different appellate results. Trial-error analysis is intensely contextual.

Experts May Attack Methodology; They Generally May Not Become Jurors of Other Experts’ Credibility

The testimony of competing experts presents a particularly difficult boundary.

Trials involving medicine, construction, engineering, accounting, valuation, insurance, causation, or other technical subjects often depend upon experts who fundamentally disagree. An expert must obviously be permitted to explain why the expert reached a different conclusion. If one engineer believes the opposing engineer used the wrong load assumptions, one physician believes another overlooked degenerative findings, or one accountant believes another employed an unsound valuation methodology, the jury must be allowed to hear the disagreement.

But there is a difference between criticizing the reasoning and serving as a human credibility instruction.

Florida decisions have repeatedly stated that an expert generally should not tell the jury whether another witness is credible. See, e.g., Calloway v. State, 210 So. 3d 1160, 1182 (Fla. 2017). Similarly, an expert ordinarily may not be used simply to attack another expert’s general ability, reputation, competence, or truthfulness.

The Fifth District explained the distinction particularly well in Network Publications, Inc. v. Bjorkman, 756 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). An expert may identify deficiencies in the methodology underlying an opposing expert’s opinion so long as the testimony does not devolve into an attack on the opposing expert’s ability, credibility, reputation, or competence.

That is the line trial lawyers should focus upon.

The proper question ordinarily is not, “Is Dr. Smith wrong?” or “Is Dr. Smith credible?” It is closer to: What data did Dr. Smith fail to consider? What assumption differs from yours? What methodology did you use? Why do you believe that methodology produces the more reliable result? What objective findings support your conclusion?

The distinction is not merely semantic. The ultimate determination of credibility belongs to the jury. An expert receives special authority because of specialized knowledge. Allowing one expert to use that authority simply to pronounce another witness unreliable creates a risk that the expert will usurp the jury’s role.

Florida Supreme Court precedent concerning improper bolstering reflects the same principle from the opposite direction. In Linn v. Fossum, 946 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006), the Court held that an expert could not bolster her own opinion on direct examination by informing the jury that she had consulted other experts in reaching it. The problem was that the testimony effectively conveyed the opinions of persons who were not before the jury and could not be cross-examined. The expert’s credibility had to stand on the admissible basis for her own opinion, not on an implied vote of confidence from unnamed colleagues.

In Medina, the trial court had entered an order in limine instructing the defense expert not to comment upon other experts and instead simply to state his own opinions. The defense expert nevertheless characterized a finding in the plaintiff’s expert report as “clearly wrong.” The Fourth District concluded that the remark violated the order and improperly commented on the opposing expert’s opinion. But because counsel obtained a sustained objection without moving for mistrial, the court concluded that the isolated comment did not rise to the level required for reversal.

Again, the existence of error and the availability of appellate relief were separate questions.

Expert Bias Is Different From an Attack on Expert Competence

None of this means that experts are insulated from effective impeachment.

Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, expressly permits a party to attack a witness’s credibility by showing that the witness is biased. A financial relationship between a retained expert and a party, insurer, or law firm therefore may be relevant to bias, subject to the discovery, privilege, evidentiary, and proportionality rules governing the particular relationship at issue.

Florida’s cases concerning discovery of attorney, insurer, physician, and expert relationships illustrate both the importance of bias evidence and the limits on obtaining it. In Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 228 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2017), the Florida Supreme Court held that the question whether a plaintiff’s attorney referred the plaintiff to a physician for treatment is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Four years later, in Younkin v. Blackwelder, 331 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 2021), the Court declined to extend Worley to discovery concerning the financial relationship between a defendant’s nonparty law firm and an expert retained by the defense. In the procedural posture presented there, the Court held that permitting such discovery did not depart from the essential requirements of law and expressly declined to reconsider Worley.

Those decisions concern discovery and privilege rather than merely the permissible wording of cross-examination or closing argument. But they reflect a broader evidentiary principle: financial bias can be a legitimate subject of impeachment when the information is otherwise discoverable and admissible.

What counsel should not do is confuse evidence of potential bias with proof of dishonesty.

An expert who has earned substantial income performing examinations for insurers may have a financial relationship that the jury is entitled to consider when evaluating bias. That fact does not, without more, establish that the expert fabricated an opinion for money. Similarly, evidence that an expert frequently testifies for plaintiffs may support an argument concerning bias, but it does not itself establish that the expert is professionally incompetent or dishonest.

The distinction matters on both sides of the courtroom.

Attorney Retention and Referral Evidence Requires Particular Caution

Evidence concerning when a personal-injury plaintiff retained an attorney presents another recurring problem.

In Watson v. Builders Square, Inc., 563 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), the Fourth District recognized that the mere fact that a plaintiff retained an attorney generally is irrelevant and improper evidence. There is an obvious danger that such evidence will be used to suggest that retaining counsel itself demonstrates litigiousness or undermines the legitimacy of a claim.

Medina illustrates another evidentiary doctrine, however: invited error.

There, a chiropractic questionnaire contained a question asking whether the plaintiff had retained an attorney. Plaintiff’s counsel introduced the unredacted questionnaire into evidence. Defense counsel later sought to question the plaintiff about the information contained in the exhibit. Although the subject ordinarily would have been improper, the Fourth District concluded that the plaintiff could not obtain a new trial based on an evidentiary problem created by the plaintiff’s own introduction of the unredacted exhibit.

The lesson reaches well beyond attorney-retention evidence. Exhibits must be reviewed before they reach the jury. A party cannot ordinarily introduce objectionable information and then obtain reversal because an opponent refers to what the party itself placed into evidence.

At the same time, lawyers should not read Medina as creating a broad license to inquire into when a plaintiff hired counsel. The result depended on the particular evidentiary record and the invited-error doctrine.

Arguments About Wealth, Poverty, and the “Big Corporation”

Florida courts also have a longstanding rule against asking jurors to decide cases based upon the relative financial conditions of the parties.

The rule prohibits attempts to generate sympathy for a financially disadvantaged party or hostility toward a wealthy defendant. The jury’s task is to decide liability and damages under the evidence and instructions, not redistribute wealth or punish a party merely because it has greater financial resources.

For that reason, references to a defendant’s deep pockets, corporate wealth, insurance resources, or superior economic position can be dangerous. The same principle operates in reverse: counsel ordinarily cannot ask jurors to reduce a lawful award because a defendant is a small business or an individual of limited means when the defendant’s ability to pay is irrelevant.

But context again matters.

In Medina, State Farm’s lawyer referred to the company as the “big guy” and mentioned its familiar name and television advertising. Viewed in isolation, the remarks had the vocabulary of an improper wealth argument. In context, however, the defense was telling jurors not to award money merely because State Farm was the defendant. The Fourth District concluded that the argument was not an invitation to impose liability because of State Farm’s financial resources.

The principle is consistent with earlier Florida cases distinguishing an improper deep-pocket appeal from an argument that attempts to neutralize such an appeal.

The safest course remains obvious: try the case on the evidence. Unless financial condition is independently relevant and admissible, there is little legitimate reason to make the parties’ relative economic circumstances part of the jury’s deliberative framework.

Misleading Argument Is Not Necessarily Reversible Argument

A more recent case further demonstrates the gap between identifying improper advocacy and obtaining a new trial.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Matthews, 373 So. 3d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023), State Farm attacked the financial bias of the plaintiff’s medical witnesses. During rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel argued that the providers had “no dog in this fight” because the plaintiff was no longer seeking past medical expenses.

The problem was that the claim for past medical expenses had not been withdrawn until the day before closing. The Fifth District agreed with State Farm that the argument was misleading to that extent.

Yet it affirmed the denial of a new trial.

The question was not simply whether counsel’s statement was misleading. The question was whether it was so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it deprived State Farm of a fair trial. The court concluded it was not.

Matthews is therefore another useful warning against turning appellate standards into categorical trial rules. “Improper” does not mean “automatic new trial.” “Misleading” does not necessarily mean “reversible.” The prejudicial impact must still be evaluated in the context of the entire proceeding.

Cumulative Error Requires Actual Errors That Matter

Trial lawyers sometimes respond to a series of relatively minor events by invoking “cumulative error.” But cumulative error is not a doctrine under which several non-errors somehow combine to create reversible error.

The concept is legitimate. Multiple errors, none independently sufficient to require a new trial, can collectively deprive a party of a fair proceeding. A trial can be compromised by accumulation.

But there must be something to accumulate.

That was another important aspect of Medina. The trial court relied on the combined effect of the challenged incidents in granting a new trial. The Fourth District disagreed because the underlying events were variously invited, unpreserved, proper in context, or insufficiently prejudicial. The appellate court therefore concluded that they did not collectively establish that the plaintiff had been denied a fair trial.

Cumulative-error analysis is consequently not arithmetic. Four questionable events are not necessarily more prejudicial than one serious error. Courts examine the nature of the errors, their relationship to one another, their relation to the central disputed issues, and their likely effect on the jury.

Appellate Courts Continue to Warn Lawyers Even When They Affirm

Another feature of Florida trial law deserves attention: affirmance is not necessarily approval.

In Kings Reyes Transport, Inc. v. Baker, 397 So. 3d 652 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024), the Sixth District affirmed a judgment arising from an automobile-negligence case. Chief Judge Traver nevertheless wrote separately to express concern regarding conduct by plaintiff’s counsel, including the handling of evidence and argument after the defendants’ causation experts had been excluded.

The separate opinion expressly warned counsel not to interpret the affirmance as approval of the conduct and collected previous appellate opinions criticizing the same lawyer’s trial conduct.

That distinction is important. Appellate courts decide whether an error warrants the legal relief requested in the case before them. A decision affirming a judgment does not convert questionable advocacy into approved advocacy.

Other Florida decisions make the same point. In Vickers v. Thomas, 237 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), the Fifth District warned that repeated improper closing arguments could eventually require a new trial in an appropriate case. More broadly, appellate courts have emphasized that trial judges possess authority to control proceedings and prevent trials from devolving into personal attacks and inflammatory advocacy.

A trial lawyer therefore should not ask merely, “Can I get away with saying this without reversal?” That is too low a standard. The better question is whether the argument advances the case through admissible evidence and legitimate inference without creating an unnecessary appellate issue.

The Trial Judge’s Role Remains Central

Much of the doctrine in this area ultimately reflects the trial judge’s superior vantage point.

The judge hears the tone of the argument, observes the jury, knows the context in which a remark arose, and can assess whether the event appeared incidental or became a theme of the trial. That explains why rulings granting or denying mistrials and new trials frequently receive deferential review, subject of course to the governing legal standards.

It also explains the importance of giving the trial judge a fair opportunity to address the problem when it occurs.

A contemporaneous objection permits the judge to stop the argument. A curative instruction may remove prejudice. A sidebar can prevent repetition. In an extreme case, the judge can grant a mistrial. Waiting until after an unfavorable verdict deprives the court of many of those options and triggers the demanding standards applicable to unpreserved misconduct.

The preservation rules are therefore not merely appellate formalities. They reflect the institutional principle that trials should be corrected, when reasonably possible, while they are still being tried.

The Practical Rule: Attack the Evidence, Not the Integrity of the Process

Florida law does not require sterile advocacy. Trial counsel may expose bias, financial motivation, inconsistencies, methodological errors, missing evidence, implausible testimony, and weaknesses in an opponent’s case. Experts may vigorously explain why competing technical conclusions are unsound. Closing argument may be forceful.

The danger arises when advocacy stops being about the record and becomes an attack on the integrity of the participants or an appeal to considerations the jury is not entitled to use.

There is an important difference between showing that an expert earns substantial income from litigation and asserting without evidentiary support that the expert sells opinions. There is a difference between demonstrating flaws in another expert’s methodology and asking one expert to declare the other professionally incompetent. There is a difference between arguing that the evidence favors one witness and personally vouching that the witness is truthful. There is a difference between describing the evidence against a corporation and asking jurors to decide against it because it is wealthy. And, as Velez Rivera illustrates, there is a difference between accurately pointing out that no admissible evidence establishes a fact and inaccurately telling the jury that no such evidence or opinion ever existed.

Those distinctions can become blurred in the intensity of trial. That is precisely why preservation and context dominate the appellate cases.

The larger lesson from Murphy, Medina, Matthews, Kings Reyes, and now Velez Rivera is that Florida law attempts to protect two interests simultaneously. Lawyers must retain enough latitude to try cases forcefully, but juries must decide those cases from admissible evidence rather than personal attacks, unsupported assertions, economic prejudice, or emotional distraction.

Not every violation justifies setting aside a verdict. But the closer advocacy comes to those boundaries, the more important it becomes for trial counsel on both sides—and the trial judge—to recognize the problem while something can still be done about it.

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