
By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.
September 28, 2026
A large federal fraud complaint has a gravitational effect. Once a government agency alleges that an investment enterprise raised hundreds of millions of dollars through fictitious trading, false account statements, or Ponzi-style payments, there is an understandable tendency to view every person associated with the enterprise through the same lens. The company was allegedly fraudulent; therefore, everyone who promoted it must have been part of the fraud.
That is not how individual liability works.
A recent Commodity Futures Trading Commission enforcement action filed in the Middle District of Florida illustrates the problem particularly well. The CFTC alleges that an international multilevel-marketing enterprise solicited more than $950 million for purported retail foreign-currency trading, promised extraordinary returns supposedly generated by professional traders, proprietary algorithms, and artificial intelligence, but actually devoted only a small fraction of participant funds to forex trading. According to the complaint, participants ultimately lost at least $406 million.
Those allegations are serious. They are also allegations against an enterprise consisting of multiple entities and individuals with allegedly different roles. For counsel representing an individual promoter, affiliate, salesperson, or other participant who did not control the enterprise’s money or internal operations, the first task is therefore analytical separation: what must the CFTC prove concerning this particular defendant, rather than what can it prove about the enterprise as a whole?
That distinction can determine the defense.
Enterprise Fraud Is Not Automatically Individual Fraud
Government enforcement complaints frequently begin with a broad narrative describing the alleged scheme and then connect individual defendants to that narrative through their particular roles. The structure is persuasive because it encourages the reader to move from the proposition that the enterprise was fraudulent to the conclusion that each defendant knowingly participated in the fraud.
Defense counsel should resist that analytical shortcut.
If an investment enterprise represented that participant funds were being traded in forex markets when, in fact, they were not, the falsity of the enterprise’s representations may eventually be established through brokerage records, bank records, cryptocurrency tracing, internal accounting, or admissions. But proof that a representation was false is not always equivalent to proof that a particular promoter knew it was false when he repeated it.
In many enforcement cases, different defendants possess very different levels of information. One principal may control the bank accounts. Another may control cryptocurrency wallets. A technology provider may administer the participant portal and enter purported investment returns. An executive may communicate directly with brokers or traders. A promoter, by contrast, may have substantial responsibility for recruiting participants while having little or no access to the financial records that would reveal whether the supposed trading was actually occurring.
The government is entitled to prove otherwise. But the distinction cannot simply be assumed away.
Scienter Matters—But Not for Every Claim
The precise statutory theory matters enormously because not every Commodity Exchange Act claim contains the same mental-state requirement.
Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b, prohibits cheating, defrauding, willfully making false reports, and willfully deceiving customers in covered commodity transactions. Courts have long recognized a scienter requirement for § 4b fraud. Mere negligence, mistake, or inadvertence ordinarily does not satisfy that standard; intentional or reckless misconduct does. See, e.g., CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2002); CFTC v. Noble Metals International, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 774 (9th Cir. 1995).
That distinction creates an obvious defense question where an individual promoter contends that he was himself deceived. If company principals supplied supposedly authentic trading statements, arranged meetings with purported brokers or traders, demonstrated supposed live trading activity, or otherwise presented apparently legitimate evidence that the enterprise was operating as represented, those facts may bear directly on whether the promoter acted intentionally or recklessly when repeating the company’s representations.
Recklessness, however, is not an easy escape hatch. In the Eleventh Circuit, recklessness can satisfy scienter where the defendant’s conduct represents an extreme departure from standards of ordinary care and the danger of misleading others was obvious. R.J. Fitzgerald, 310 F.3d at 1328-29. A promoter cannot therefore avoid fraud liability merely by declining to ask obvious questions while collecting substantial compensation from increasingly implausible representations.
The inquiry is intensely factual. What did the promoter know? What should have caused him to question what he had been told? What diligence did he perform? What information was withheld from him? When did warning signs emerge? What did he do when they did?
The defense becomes much weaker if contemporaneous communications show that the promoter learned the trading was fictitious and continued making the same representations. It becomes materially stronger if those communications show repeated requests for verification followed by false assurances from the people controlling the enterprise.
Section 4o requires even more care. Section 4o(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1), prohibits commodity pool operators, commodity trading advisors, and their associated persons from employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or engaging in a transaction, practice, or course of business that operates as a fraud or deceit upon clients or pool participants. The Eleventh Circuit has held that § 4o(1)(B), unlike traditional fraud provisions, does not require proof of scienter. Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 677 (11th Cir. 1988).
Accordingly, a defense based entirely on “I did not know” is incomplete. Counsel must analyze each count separately rather than treating scienter as a global defense to the complaint.
What Did the Individual Actually Represent?
The next task is to atomize the government’s narrative.
An enforcement complaint may summarize years of promotional activity in a handful of pages. Litigation should proceed in the opposite direction. Every allegedly fraudulent representation should be identified and placed on a timeline.
For each statement, counsel should ask what precisely was said; when it was said; who supplied the underlying information; what documents or demonstrations supported it; what contrary information was available at that time; whether the speaker claimed personal knowledge; and whether later events changed what the speaker reasonably could believe.
Consider a promoter who tells prospective participants that professional traders are generating profitable forex returns using proprietary technology. The statement may ultimately prove false. But the liability analysis differs substantially depending upon whether the promoter invented the representation, received it from company management without investigation, or personally met purported traders and was shown apparently authentic trading records.
Likewise, a statement that “I have personally verified the trading” presents a different problem from a statement that “the company reports that its traders generated this return.” The former may expose the promoter to an inquiry into exactly what was supposedly verified and whether that verification was real. The latter may raise questions concerning whether repeating the company’s statement was reasonable or reckless.
The government should be required to prove the defendant’s own case, representation by representation, rather than relying upon the aggregate misconduct of the enterprise.
Promoter, Operator, or Associated Person?
Role classification presents another potentially important battleground.
The Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations regulate commodity pool operators and their associated persons. In the retail-forex context, an associated person may include a natural person associated with a commodity pool operator as a partner, officer, employee, consultant, agent, or person performing similar functions where that person’s role involves soliciting funds for participation in a pooled vehicle or supervising others who do so. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 5.1(d), 5.3.
The Middle District of Florida has applied these provisions in prior forex enforcement litigation. In CFTC v. Allied Markets, LLC, the court treated individuals who solicited and accepted funds for a purported forex pool as associated persons of the commodity pool operator. No. 3:15-cv-5-J-34JRK, 2019 WL 357717 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2019). Similar associated-person theories appeared in the substantial Oasis International Group litigation in the Tampa Division.
That does not mean the label “promoter” automatically resolves the statutory question. Counsel should examine the individual’s actual relationship to the alleged commodity pool operator, whether the enterprise legally qualified as a CPO, whether the defendant’s conduct fell within the regulatory definition of an associated person, whether the transactions were covered retail-forex transactions, and whether any registration exemption or other regulatory limitation applies.
The registration issue also should be separated from fraud. An individual may have believed an enterprise was legitimate yet still face a regulatory claim for acting in a capacity requiring registration. Conversely, the government’s characterization of a person’s position in the marketing hierarchy does not eliminate its obligation to establish the regulatory elements.
Control of the Enterprise Matters
The defense should then reconstruct who actually controlled the instrumentalities of the alleged fraud.
Who possessed authority over participant funds? Who controlled the wallets? Who had access to bank accounts? Who could see the brokerage accounts? Who maintained the participant portal? Who entered purported investment returns? Who decided whether withdrawal requests were honored? Who had access to actual trading records? Who communicated with purported counterparties? Who prepared statements sent to participants?
These are not merely background questions. They can define the individual defendant’s ability to know whether the representations being made to him and by him were true.
A defendant with administrative access to the system showing that supposed trading returns were simply being inserted manually occupies a fundamentally different evidentiary position from a promoter who received the resulting statements and was told they reflected actual trades.
That distinction also creates potential adversity among defendants. The promoter’s strongest defense may be that the operators deceived him. The operators may contend that the promoter understood exactly how the enterprise functioned. A common interest in defeating the CFTC does not eliminate those conflicting factual positions.
Joint-defense arrangements should therefore be approached with care.
Follow the Money—But Follow the Individual’s Money
Large enforcement cases naturally emphasize large numbers. If an enterprise raised hundreds of millions of dollars, the government’s complaint will understandably feature that figure prominently.
Individual monetary liability requires a more precise analysis.
Defense counsel should determine exactly what money reached the individual defendant, what accounts or cryptocurrency wallets he actually controlled, how those funds arrived, what portion was retained, what portion was transferred to others, and whether particular payments represented commissions, return of capital, participant distributions, business expenses, or some other category.
Blockchain analysis can be particularly important where the enterprise operated through cryptocurrency. Merely identifying a wallet as associated with a defendant may not resolve beneficial ownership, control, source of funds, or disposition.
The same precision should apply to loss causation and remedies. Enterprise-wide losses may provide context for the alleged scheme, but they should not automatically become the measure of restitution, disgorgement, or other monetary relief attributable to every individual defendant.
The remedial law also matters. Restitution, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, and injunctive relief serve different purposes and may involve different calculations. Defense counsel should insist that each requested remedy be tied to the statutory authority supporting it and to the conduct properly attributable to the individual defendant.
Contemporaneous Evidence Usually Matters More Than Reconstruction
The most important evidence in an individual promoter case may not be the promotional video that initially attracts attention. It may be a private message sent months earlier asking a company principal for proof that the trading actually occurred.
For that reason, preservation must begin immediately.
Relevant evidence can include email accounts, text messages, WhatsApp and Telegram communications, cloud-storage accounts, social-media messages, phones, computers, brokerage records, cryptocurrency exchange records, wallet histories, webinars, participant dashboards, promotional presentations, internal reports, and communications with traders, accountants, lawyers, brokers, and other promoters.
The chronology is particularly important. If a defendant asserts that he was deceived, counsel should locate contemporaneous evidence of what he was told and what he believed before litigation sharpened everyone’s memories.
A text message asking, “Can you send me the brokerage statement supporting these returns?” followed by a false document supplied by management may be far more probative than testimony years later that the promoter trusted the company.
The converse is equally true. Evidence showing that a promoter privately acknowledged that there was no trading while publicly assuring participants that the operation was legitimate could be devastating.
The documents determine which narrative is real.
The Civil Case May Carry a Criminal Shadow
A CFTC enforcement action is civil. The Commission can seek injunctions, restitution, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, and trading or registration restrictions. It cannot sentence a defendant to prison.
That should not be confused with an absence of criminal exposure.
The Department of Justice prosecutes commodities fraud, and civil regulatory proceedings can proceed in parallel with criminal investigations. Depending upon the facts, potential criminal theories can include wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, conspiracy, money laundering, and criminal violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. Section 13 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13, makes certain knowing violations felonies punishable by imprisonment of up to ten years.
The practical consequence is that civil litigation strategy cannot be developed in isolation.
A defendant may understandably want to call the regulator immediately and explain that he was also deceived. That instinct can be dangerous. An informal explanation, sworn declaration, interrogatory response, deposition, or document production in the civil case can create evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.
Counsel therefore should determine, as early as reasonably possible, whether there is evidence of a parallel criminal investigation, whether federal agents have contacted other participants, whether grand-jury subpoenas exist, and whether separate white-collar criminal counsel should participate in strategic decisions.
The Fifth Amendment does not disappear because the first case filed happens to bear a civil docket number.
A Lack-of-Knowledge Defense Has Limits
The proposition that an individual promoter may have been deceived should not be romanticized.
There is a difference between genuine lack of knowledge and deliberate ignorance. Courts do not permit sophisticated market participants to insulate themselves from fraud liability simply by avoiding information that would reveal the truth. Recklessness can satisfy the scienter requirement applicable to important CEA fraud provisions, and some regulatory theories do not require scienter at all.
The defense therefore cannot stop at the defendant’s assertion that he trusted management.
It must answer harder questions. Were promised returns objectively extraordinary? Did withdrawal problems persist? Did regulators or other market participants raise warnings? Did the defendant continue promoting after those warnings appeared? Did compensation increase as the problems became more obvious? Did supposed trading results remain suspiciously consistent regardless of market conditions? Did the defendant claim to have independently verified facts that he had never actually verified?
A credible lack-of-knowledge defense must survive those questions.
Limitations and Territorial Questions Should Not Be Ignored
Large international trading schemes also raise issues that may disappear beneath the fraud narrative.
Government claims seeking civil penalties can implicate the five-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, depending upon the claim and remedy. The Supreme Court’s decisions concerning government enforcement remedies require counsel to analyze precisely when claims accrued and whether the remedy sought is punitive or compensatory.
International conduct presents another layer. Where a substantial portion of participants, transactions, entities, and alleged misconduct were outside the United States, defense counsel should examine the statutory basis for applying particular Commodity Exchange Act provisions to that conduct and whether the government is impermissibly using domestic activity to reach foreign transactions.
Neither issue necessarily defeats an enforcement action. Both deserve actual analysis rather than being lost in the scale of the allegations.
The Defense Is Often Narrower Than “The Company Was Legitimate”
One of the most important strategic decisions in a government fraud case is choosing what not to defend.
If objective records ultimately establish that an enterprise was not conducting the trading it represented to participants, an individual defendant may gain nothing by attempting to prove that the entire business was legitimate.
The legally relevant defense may be considerably narrower.
The defendant may contend that he did not control the enterprise, did not control participant funds, did not create fictitious trading records, did not know those records were false when he relied upon them, and did not possess the internal information available to the principals operating the business.
Whether that defense succeeds depends upon the evidence. But it is analytically legitimate even where the underlying enterprise ultimately proves fraudulent.
This is why large multi-defendant government cases should not be defended by reading the first twenty pages of the complaint, accepting the government’s characterization of the enterprise, and assuming that characterization answers every question concerning every defendant.
The government must prove the claims it actually brought against the individual defendant. The defense begins by identifying each statutory element, separating that defendant’s conduct from the conduct of the enterprise, reconstructing what he knew and when he knew it, tracing the money, preserving the contemporaneous evidence, and accounting for the possibility that the civil case is only one part of the government’s investigation.
That approach does not presume innocence or guilt. It does something more basic to the adversarial system: it insists upon proving the case against the person who is actually before the court.
