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The Statute Says It Is a Crime. The Court Says It Is a Right: Florida’s Open-Carry Law and the Problem of Zombie Statutes

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By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

September 23, 2026

A lawyer asked today whether open carry is lawful in Florida might reasonably begin with the Florida Statutes. That is, after all, where modern legal research usually begins. Although American lawyers continue to describe ours as a common-law legal system, enormous areas of contemporary practice are dominated by comprehensive statutory schemes. Criminal law is overwhelmingly statutory. So are substantial portions of construction law, environmental law, employment law, insurance law, family law, commercial law, and administrative law. In ordinary practice, the statutory code often functions as the lawyer’s first map of the governing law.

In the case of Florida open carry, however, that map presently points in conflicting directions.

Section 790.053 of the 2026 Florida Statutes continues to provide that, except as otherwise authorized, “it is unlawful for any person to openly carry on or about his or her person any firearm or electric weapon or device.” The statute classifies a violation as a second-degree misdemeanor. A lawyer—or an ordinary citizen—who reads the official Florida Statutes and stops there would naturally conclude that Florida generally prohibits the open carrying of firearms.

Yet on September 10, 2025, the First District Court of Appeal expressly declared section 790.053 unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. McDaniels v. State, 419 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). Five days later, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier issued formal guidance to Florida law-enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities explaining that the First District had struck down the State’s open-carry prohibition.

The Legislature nevertheless has not removed section 790.053 from the Florida Statutes.

That discrepancy presents more than a technical curiosity. It illustrates what are sometimes informally called “zombie statutes”: legislative enactments that remain visibly present in a statutory code even though judicial decisions have deprived them of some or all of their enforceability. The phenomenon exists at both the state and federal levels. Florida’s open-carry controversy is particularly instructive because the statute imposes criminal liability, the constitutional ruling came from an intermediate appellate court rather than the Florida Supreme Court, and another Florida district court has subsequently complicated any suggestion that McDaniels necessarily settled the statute’s status throughout the State.

The consequences ceased to be abstract on September 9, 2026, when two men carrying rifles walked along public sidewalks immediately adjacent to the University of Florida campus in Gainesville. Students reported them to police. University police monitored them. A campus safety alert followed. No arrest occurred. University officials explained that the men had remained outside university property and that Florida law did not prohibit the open carrying of rifles in those public spaces.

The Gainesville episode demonstrated, in real time, the difficulties that arise when the words printed in a criminal statute and the law actually being administered by police appear to point in different directions.

Florida’s Traditional Open-Carry Prohibition

Florida historically prohibited ordinary open carry while permitting concealed carry through a licensing system and, more recently, permitless concealed carry for persons satisfying statutory eligibility requirements. Section 790.053 supplied the general open-carry prohibition, while section 790.25 contained a series of exceptions.

Those exceptions include firearms possession associated with hunting, fishing, camping, target shooting, firearms exhibitions, and travel to or from certain lawful activities. For years, Florida law therefore could permit visible possession of a firearm while a person was engaged in, or traveling to or from, fishing or camping while generally prohibiting the same person from openly carrying a firearm while walking down a city street.

The Florida Supreme Court upheld that statutory arrangement in Norman v. State, 215 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2017). Norman involved a Second Amendment challenge to section 790.053. Applying the constitutional methodology then widely used by lower courts after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Florida Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny and held that Florida’s open-carry restriction did not violate the Second Amendment or the Florida Constitution.

Five years later, however, the United States Supreme Court substantially changed the governing methodology in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Bruen rejected the two-step means-end scrutiny framework many lower courts had been using in Second Amendment cases. Instead, once conduct falls within the Second Amendment’s text, the government must justify its regulation by demonstrating consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

That methodological change eventually returned section 790.053 to a Florida appellate court.

McDaniels and the First District’s Rejection of the Open-Carry Ban

Stanley Victor McDaniels deliberately sought to create a constitutional test case.

According to the First District’s opinion, McDaniels stood at an intersection in downtown Pensacola on July 4, 2022. He held a copy of the United States Constitution, waved to passing motorists, and carried a loaded handgun in an inside-the-waistband holster in a manner that left the firearm visible. He also set up a camera on a tripod to record what occurred. The First District specifically noted that McDaniels was not threatening anyone.

When law-enforcement officers arrived, McDaniels cooperated. He produced a Florida concealed-carry license and explained that he wanted to bring a legal challenge that could ultimately reach a higher court. Officers told him that concealed carry was lawful but open carry was not. After confirming that he was not otherwise prohibited from possessing the firearm, officers seized the handgun and later obtained a warrant for his arrest. McDaniels ultimately was convicted of violating section 790.053.

The First District reversed.

In McDaniels v. State, the court concluded that Bruen had displaced the intermediate-scrutiny methodology on which Norman rested. Rather than independently balancing governmental interests against the burden imposed on the right to bear arms, the court examined the Second Amendment’s text and the historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The First District concluded that the constitutional protection of the right to “bear” arms encompasses public carry. Because McDaniels’s conduct implicated the Second Amendment, the burden fell on the State under Bruen to demonstrate that Florida’s categorical open-carry prohibition was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The court concluded that the State had not carried that burden. Historical authorities demonstrated that governments had regulated the manner in which weapons could be carried, including restrictions on concealed carry, but the First District found no historical tradition sufficient to justify a categorical prohibition preventing ordinary law-abiding adults from carrying firearms openly in public.

The court did not hold that open carry is immune from regulation. Nor did it invalidate restrictions concerning prohibited persons, sensitive places, threatening conduct, or other firearms regulations not before it. Its holding concerned Florida’s general prohibition against ordinary open carry by law-abiding adults.

The disposition itself was unequivocal: the First District declared section 790.053 unconstitutional, vacated McDaniels’s conviction, and reversed his sentence.

The Attorney General’s Response

The executive branch responded within days.

On September 15, 2025, Attorney General James Uthmeier issued a formal memorandum addressed to “Florida’s Law Enforcement Agencies and Prosecuting Authorities.” The memorandum explained that McDaniels had struck down section 790.053 and summarized the First District’s conclusion that law-abiding adult citizens possess a Second Amendment right to carry firearms openly in public.

That guidance was practically significant. The Legislature’s official statute book continued to characterize ordinary open carry as a misdemeanor, while the State’s chief legal officer was advising the officials responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes that an appellate court had invalidated that prohibition.

For lawyers, this provides an obvious warning against treating statutory text as the endpoint of legal research. For citizens, however, the distinction is less satisfactory. Criminal statutes exist in significant part to provide notice of conduct the State prohibits. A person ordinarily should not be expected to master Florida’s rules of appellate precedent, locate a constitutional decision from a district court of appeal, examine an Attorney General guidance memorandum, and investigate later appellate authority merely to determine whether conduct expressly described as criminal in the official statute book can actually be prosecuted.

The problem becomes still more complicated because Florida’s appellate courts have not spoken with one voice.

The Fourth District Complicates the Statewide Picture

If McDaniels had definitively resolved the issue throughout Florida, section 790.053’s continuing presence in the statute book might appear to be nothing more than legislative housekeeping that had not yet occurred. A subsequent decision from the Fourth District demonstrates why the legal situation is more complicated.

In Eubanks v. State, No. 4D2025-1698 (Fla. 4th DCA June 17, 2026), the Fourth District considered whether Florida could deny an 18-year-old defendant the ability to carry a concealed firearm when other law-abiding adults could lawfully exercise that right. The court ultimately held the challenged age-based restriction unconstitutional.

During its analysis, however, the Fourth District addressed McDaniels. The availability of open carry mattered because the State argued, among other things, about the extent to which Eubanks had alternative means of exercising the right to public carry.

The Fourth District recognized that McDaniels had declared section 790.053 unconstitutional and also agreed that Bruen had displaced the intermediate-scrutiny methodology employed in Norman. But the Fourth District emphasized an important feature of Florida appellate law: a decision of one district court of appeal is not binding on another district court of appeal. A sister district’s decision is persuasive authority.

Because Eubanks had not been charged with violating section 790.053, the Fourth District concluded that the constitutionality of the open-carry statute itself was not properly before it. A definitive ruling on that question would therefore have been unnecessary to the disposition of the case.

The court nevertheless made an important observation. It stated that although the Attorney General had advised that the State would no longer defend prosecutions under section 790.053, the statute remained on the books and was “presently valid and potentially enforceable” within the Fourth District because the First District’s decision did not bind the Fourth District.

That language substantially complicates any simple statement that Florida’s open-carry ban has ceased to exist statewide.

The First District has declared section 790.053 unconstitutional. The Attorney General has issued law-enforcement guidance based upon that decision. The Fourth District has recognized McDaniels but has expressly stated that a sister district’s decision does not bind it and that section 790.053 remains potentially enforceable within the Fourth District. Meanwhile, the Florida Supreme Court has not issued a post-Bruen decision definitively resolving the constitutionality of section 790.053.

That distinction matters. It would be too categorical to say simply that the Legislature continues to publish a statute that is unquestionably void everywhere in Florida. The more precise—and legally more interesting—description is that Florida continues to publish a criminal statute that one district court has expressly declared unconstitutional, that the Attorney General has advised law-enforcement authorities concerning that ruling, and that another district has stated remains potentially enforceable within its jurisdiction.

Why Doesn’t the Florida Legislature Simply Fix the Statute?

Florida law contains a formal statutory-revision process, but that process does not mean that judicial invalidation automatically deletes statutory text.

Section 11.242 directs the Office of Legislative Services to conduct a “systematic and continuing study” of Florida’s statutes and laws for purposes including reducing unnecessary material, removing inconsistencies and redundancies, improving clarity, and preparing reviser’s bills and other proposed statutory changes for submission to the Legislature.

The statute also addresses laws that no longer should be carried forward. Section 11.242(5)(i) provides that statutes or portions of statutes that have expired, become obsolete, “been held invalid by a court of last resort,” served their purpose, or been repealed or superseded are to be omitted “through the process of reviser’s bills duly enacted by the Legislature.”

Those final words matter. The statutory-revision office does not possess free-standing authority to erase substantive legislation merely because a court has cast doubt upon or invalidated it. The statute contemplates legislative enactment of a reviser’s bill.

The reference to a “court of last resort” also matters. The Florida Supreme Court is Florida’s highest court. The First District Court of Appeal is an intermediate appellate court. Whatever effect McDaniels has upon prosecutions and trial-court proceedings, it is not a decision of Florida’s court of last resort. The Fourth District’s subsequent discussion in Eubanks makes the absence of a single statewide appellate answer particularly significant.

There is therefore no basis to assume that section 11.242 required the Legislature automatically to remove section 790.053 immediately after McDaniels. Nor does the statute book function as a database in which a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality automatically causes enacted words to disappear.

The Legislature remains free to address the issue substantively. It could repeal the existing prohibition, amend it to reflect whatever restrictions lawmakers believe remain constitutionally permissible after Bruen and McDaniels, or otherwise restructure Florida’s open-carry laws. What courts generally cannot do is exercise legislative power themselves by commanding legislators to enact a particular replacement statute.

That division of responsibilities is a consequence of separation of powers. Courts adjudicate the validity and enforceability of legislation in cases properly before them. Legislatures enact, amend, and repeal statutory text. Those processes do not necessarily occur simultaneously.

The result is that language can remain in an official statutory code even after judicial decisions have substantially changed its practical legal force.

Zombie Statutes Are Not Peculiar to Florida

Federal law provides an especially clear illustration.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 700 remains part of the United States Code. Its text provides criminal penalties for specified forms of knowing physical desecration of the American flag.

The statute is still there.

Yet in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that the Flag Protection Act’s prohibition on expressive flag desecration violated the First Amendment. The government therefore cannot enforce section 700 in the manner the statute’s operative language appears to contemplate.

More than three decades later, section 700 continues to occupy a numbered section of the federal criminal code. The official United States Code does not silently erase the provision. Instead, the Office of the Law Revision Counsel includes a constitutionality note directing readers to the Supreme Court’s constitutional treatment of the statute.

The example illustrates the institutional distinction at the heart of the zombie-statute problem. Congress enacted the statutory language. The Supreme Court determined that the Constitution prohibited its enforcement against protected expressive conduct. Unless Congress repeals or replaces the legislation, the enacted text can remain visible even though constitutional law prevents the government from giving it its apparent effect.

There are legitimate reasons why codifiers do not simply delete every provision affected by a judicial decision. Courts may invalidate statutes facially or only as applied. A particular provision may be severable. Later cases may define the scope of a constitutional holding. Different courts can disagree. Codification personnel generally are not vested with legislative authority to make substantive judgments about how much statutory text should survive.

Those institutional considerations do not eliminate the practical problem for lawyers and citizens attempting to learn the law from the code.

The Gainesville Rifle Demonstration Turns Doctrine Into Reality

The practical consequences became unusually visible in Gainesville on September 9, 2026.

At approximately 12:25 p.m., according to the University of Florida Police Department, officers received reports of two individuals walking along a public sidewalk adjacent to the Gainesville campus carrying what appeared to be rifles. The men remained on public sidewalks and did not enter university property.

Their presence generated immediate concern among students and others on campus. WUFT reported that students questioned the men’s motives on social media and wondered why the University was not taking action. A WUFT photograph showed the two rifle-carrying men walking across from Tigert Hall while being followed by a University of Florida police officer.

At 1:57 p.m., approximately ninety minutes after the initial report, University police issued a campus safety message explaining what was occurring. The police department emphasized that the individuals were walking along the campus boundary on public sidewalks and had not entered campus. The message acknowledged that the demonstration could be alarming but stated that Florida law did not prohibit individuals from openly carrying rifles in public spaces. UFPD thanked those who had reported the incident and emphasized that campus safety depended upon vigilance.

Local television station WCJB interviewed one of the men, who uses the name “Freedom Franko” on social media. WCJB reported that he had been walking through North Central Florida communities openly carrying firearms as part of an effort to educate people about Florida firearms law and challenge what he regarded as misinformation and stigma surrounding open carry. The station described him as carrying an AK-47-style rifle.

Franko specifically discussed what he viewed as a misconception concerning firearms near schools. He told WCJB that the law was more nuanced than a categorical rule forbidding firearm possession within a fixed distance of school property, and he said his purpose was to demonstrate what he believed Florida law permitted in public areas adjacent to a school or university. According to WCJB, police did not interfere with him during the Gainesville demonstration, and he said he intended to continue similar demonstrations in other North Central Florida communities.

Whatever one thinks of that method of public education, the incident presents an unusually concrete illustration of the statutory problem.

A person opening section 790.053 of the Florida Statutes that afternoon could read statutory language stating that open carry was unlawful. At the same time, students near the University of Florida could see two men openly carrying rifles. Police officers were aware of them, monitored them, and did not arrest them merely for carrying the rifles on the public sidewalks. The University’s official safety message then told thousands of students and employees that Florida law did not prohibit the conduct occurring in those public spaces.

Three different components of the legal system were therefore visible at once.

The first was enacted statutory text, which continued to announce a general open-carry prohibition.

The second was appellate constitutional law, principally McDaniels, which had declared the general prohibition unconstitutional under the methodology required by Bruen.

The third was executive enforcement practice. The Attorney General had issued guidance concerning McDaniels, and University police were treating the open carrying of rifles on the adjoining public sidewalks, without more, as conduct that did not provide a basis for arrest.

For a law student, the situation might make an excellent examination question. For citizens watching armed individuals walk alongside a major public university, the distinction is not academic.

Open Carry Is Not the Same as Carry Anywhere

The Gainesville incident also illustrates why careful description of the law matters. A constitutional ruling invalidating a general prohibition against open carry does not erase the rest of Florida firearms law.

Florida continues to regulate firearms based upon location, the status of the person possessing the weapon, and the person’s conduct. Schools and university property raise legal issues different from ordinary public sidewalks. Other statutes govern firearms at specified sensitive locations and prohibit conduct such as threatening exhibition, unlawful discharge, possession by prohibited persons, and use of firearms in connection with criminal activity.

McDaniels itself did not hold that every person may carry every firearm everywhere. Its analysis concerned the State’s categorical prohibition against ordinary law-abiding adults openly carrying firearms in public for lawful purposes.

That distinction is important because the continued presence of section 790.053 can generate misunderstanding in both directions. Someone who reads only the statutory text may conclude that ordinary open carry remains categorically criminal. Someone who hears only that McDaniels declared the statute unconstitutional may conclude that Florida no longer meaningfully regulates open carry at all.

Neither proposition adequately describes the present legal landscape.

The Deeper Problem: Statutory Text Is Not Necessarily Operative Law

The controversy exposes a larger tension in modern legal research.

American law remains rooted historically in the common-law tradition, but practicing lawyers increasingly work inside dense statutory and regulatory systems. Beginning research with the relevant code is therefore entirely sensible. In many areas, a statute establishes the elements of a claim or crime, available remedies, applicable deadlines, administrative prerequisites, defenses, and jurisdiction.

Codification, however, can create an illusion of completeness.

The statute book records what a legislature enacted. It does not necessarily reveal, in the operative text itself, everything subsequent judicial decisions have done to that enactment. A provision may have been narrowly construed, partially invalidated, rendered unenforceable in certain applications, overtaken by later constitutional doctrine, or subjected to conflicting interpretations by different appellate courts.

Competent legal research therefore requires more than locating the current statutory text. Lawyers ordinarily must determine how courts have subsequently treated the statute.

But criminal codes are not written solely for lawyers. They regulate ordinary citizens and provide authority for police officers, prosecutors, courts, and ultimately the State to deprive individuals of liberty. The informational problem is consequently more serious when the statute at issue purports to define a crime.

Irrespective of one’s substantive view of firearms policy, there is an obvious tension when an official criminal statute tells citizens in unqualified language that specified conduct is a misdemeanor while an appellate court has declared that prohibition unconstitutional and the Attorney General has advised law-enforcement authorities concerning that ruling.

The problem becomes even more difficult when another appellate district says the first district’s decision does not bind it.

Who Ultimately Cleans Up the Law?

Section 11.242 gives Florida a mechanism for statutory revision, but it does not erase the institutional distinctions among courts, codifiers, and legislators.

The Office of Legislative Services can study the statutes, identify inconsistencies and obsolete material, and prepare reviser’s bills and other proposed amendments. Section 11.242(5)(i) specifically contemplates omission, through reviser’s bills duly enacted by the Legislature, of provisions that have expired, become obsolete, been held invalid by a court of last resort, served their purpose, or been repealed or superseded.

But the operative mechanism remains legislation.

That makes particular sense in a case such as this one. McDaniels is a decision of the First District, not the Florida Supreme Court. Eubanks subsequently made explicit that one district court does not bind another and that the Fourth District regarded section 790.053 as potentially enforceable there. The Florida Supreme Court has not yet issued a post-Bruen opinion providing a definitive statewide resolution.

The Legislature need not wait for the judicial system to finish that process. It can act at any time to conform statutory language to constitutional developments or establish a new regulatory framework designed to satisfy the governing constitutional standard. But until it does, the text and the decisional law can remain out of alignment.

There is no contradiction in saying both that courts possess the authority to refuse enforcement of unconstitutional statutes and that the enacted words remain in the statute book until the legislative process alters them. Those propositions describe different governmental functions.

The practical cost of that institutional distinction is uncertainty.

A Lawyer Who Stops at the Statute Has Not Finished the Research

Suppose a lawyer unfamiliar with the controversy receives a question today about whether open carry is lawful in Florida. The lawyer pulls up section 790.053 on the Florida Legislature’s official website. The statutory text appears straightforward: open carry is unlawful, and violation is a misdemeanor.

The research cannot end there.

The lawyer must find Norman and understand why the Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute in 2017. The lawyer must then understand how Bruen changed the governing Second Amendment methodology. The lawyer must find McDaniels and recognize that the First District expressly declared section 790.053 unconstitutional. The lawyer should know that the Attorney General issued guidance to Florida law-enforcement agencies and prosecutors following that ruling. And after June 2026, the lawyer must also find Eubanks and understand the Fourth District’s conclusion that McDaniels does not bind a sister district and that section 790.053 remains potentially enforceable there.

Only after performing that work can counsel begin to give a careful answer.

That is a remarkable amount of doctrine necessary to understand a criminal statute whose operative prohibition occupies only a few sentences.

The phenomenon is neither uniquely Floridian nor uniquely associated with firearms. The continued publication of 18 U.S.C. § 700 more than three decades after Eichman provides a particularly clear federal illustration. Similar situations can arise whenever enacted statutory language remains unrepealed after constitutional litigation has substantially changed the government’s ability to enforce it.

Courts and legislatures perform different constitutional functions, and that division explains why a judicial decision does not automatically erase words from a code. But institutional explanations do not eliminate the informational consequences.

The September 2026 Gainesville episode makes those consequences unusually difficult to ignore. Two men openly carrying rifles walked beside one of the Nation’s largest public universities. Students called the police. Officers monitored the men rather than arresting them. University officials warned the campus community that the situation could be alarming while simultaneously explaining that the conduct occurring on the public sidewalks was not prohibited by Florida law.

At the same time, anyone visiting the Florida Legislature’s official website could still read section 790.053 declaring open carry unlawful.

That is the peculiar life of a zombie statute. The Legislature’s words remain in the code. Judicial decisions alter their legal force. Executive officials must determine how to administer the law in the resulting landscape. And lawyers who assume that the current statute book necessarily supplies the complete current answer do so at their peril.

Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Florida Constitution, Florida Constitutional Law, Government Abuse of Citizenry, Government Law, Local Government Law, Mythology in the Law, Public Schools, Second Amendment, United States Constitution
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