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Appraisal, Coverage, and the Right to Repair in Florida Property Insurance Litigation

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By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

September 23, 2026

Appraisal occupies an unusual position in Florida property insurance law. It is a contractual mechanism intended to provide an efficient means of resolving disputes concerning the amount of an insured loss, but it operates within a larger contractual and procedural framework in which courts retain responsibility for questions of coverage, policy interpretation, contractual enforceability, and compliance with conditions that may determine whether the right to appraisal exists at all. Much of the difficulty in the reported cases arises when these analytically distinct questions are compressed into a single inquiry about whether a dispute should be decided by “the court” or “the appraisers.”

Florida law has developed considerably beyond that binary formulation. The cases now require attention to at least three distinct concepts. The first is the scope of appraisal: assuming appraisal is available, what issues have the parties contractually committed to appraisers rather than a judge or jury? The second concerns the existence and enforceability of the right to appraisal itself: have the contractual conditions for appraisal occurred, and is the provision being invoked legally enforceable? The third concerns sequencing: when an appraisable amount-of-loss dispute coexists with a judicial coverage issue, must one necessarily be decided before the other?

Those distinctions have become especially important since the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in American Coastal Insurance Co. v. San Marco Villas Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 379 So. 3d 1099 (Fla. 2024). San Marco Villas rejected an inflexible rule requiring judicial resolution of all coverage questions before appraisal, but it did not transfer coverage questions to appraisers, eliminate contractual conditions precedent to appraisal, or require appraisal whenever it is demanded. Rather, the decision confirms that the respective roles of courts and appraisers remain principally matters of contract, while distinguishing the allocation of decisional authority from the order in which different issues may be resolved.

Appraisal Is a Creature of Contract

Florida appraisal law begins with the policy. An appraisal provision is neither an independent source of substantive rights nor a generalized form of judicially created alternative dispute resolution. The right exists because the parties’ insurance contract creates it, and its scope and prerequisites ordinarily must be determined from the language of that contract.

The Florida Supreme Court emphasized this contractual character in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Suarez, 833 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2002). The Court rejected the proposition that a conventional insurance appraisal provision should be treated as an agreement to conduct formal arbitration under the Florida Arbitration Code. Although both appraisal and arbitration remove certain disputes from conventional judicial adjudication, the two procedures are materially different. Appraisal ordinarily calls upon appraisers with relevant expertise to determine value or amount of loss through the comparatively informal process contemplated by the policy. Once a court determines that the appraisal provision has been properly invoked, the proceeding is to be conducted according to the contractual appraisal mechanism rather than transformed into formal statutory arbitration. Id. at 765–66.

That principle has consequences beyond procedure. Because the parties derive their rights from the policy, the policy determines what constitutes a sufficient disagreement to trigger appraisal, what obligations must precede it, what questions the appraisers may decide, whether their award is binding, and what rights remain reserved to the insurer after an award. Florida courts therefore repeatedly return to the text of the insurance contract rather than treating “appraisal” as a freestanding doctrine applicable identically to every property-insurance dispute.

The Foundational Division Between Coverage and Amount of Loss

The modern Florida framework rests substantially on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Licea, 685 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1996). Licea arose from a dispute over the effect of a retained-rights provision under which the insurer could participate in appraisal without surrendering its right ultimately to deny the claim. The insured argued that such a reservation destroyed the mutuality necessary to make the appraisal provision binding. The Supreme Court rejected that position and, in doing so, articulated the division between issues committed to appraisal and issues reserved for the judiciary.

The Court explained that appraisal determines the “amount of loss,” but it gave that term a substantive meaning extending beyond simple arithmetic. An appraisal of the amount of loss necessarily can include the cost of repairing or replacing damaged property and determining whether particular items of damage requiring repair or replacement resulted from a covered peril or from excluded causes such as normal wear and tear or dry rot. At the same time, an insurer may retain judicial defenses asserting that there is no coverage for the loss as a whole or that the insured violated policy conditions such as those concerning fraud, notice, or cooperation. Licea, 685 So. 2d at 1287–88.

That distinction is more subtle than saying that “causation” belongs either to courts or to appraisers. An appraisal panel cannot create insurance coverage that the policy does not provide. Yet determining the amount of damage caused by an admittedly covered event may require appraisers to make factual judgments about causation. If a hurricane damages a roof that also contains deterioration unrelated to the storm, for example, the process of determining the amount of covered storm damage may necessarily require separating storm-related damage from preexisting deterioration. That inquiry may properly be part of determining the amount of loss even though causation is involved.

The Florida Supreme Court confronted that distinction directly in Johnson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 828 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2002). The Court held that causation constitutes a judicial coverage question when the insurer wholly denies that the claimed loss resulted from a covered peril, but causation may constitute an amount-of-loss question when the insurer admits that a covered loss occurred and the disagreement concerns how much damage resulted from it. Id. at 1025–26.

The significance of Johnson is therefore not that the Court assigned the abstract subject of causation categorically to one decisionmaker. It instead examined the nature of the particular dispute. A disagreement over whether a claimed event falls within the policy’s coverage at all is different from a disagreement over the extent of damage caused by an admittedly covered event. The first involves the insurer’s legal obligation to provide coverage; the second ordinarily concerns valuation and the amount of the covered loss.

The Right to Appraisal Must Be Triggered Before Its Scope or Timing Matters

The distinction between coverage and amount of loss presupposes that the contractual right to appraisal has actually arisen. Florida cases, particularly in the Third District, have accordingly treated the existence of an appraisable dispute as an antecedent contractual question rather than merely another issue concerning the sequence of litigation.

The Third District’s en banc decision in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Romay, 744 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), is foundational in this respect. The court receded from earlier decisions suggesting that submission of a sworn proof of loss alone was sufficient to compel appraisal and instead enforced the post-loss obligations contained in the policies before it. The court reasoned that the contractual “disagreement” necessary to trigger appraisal contemplated a meaningful exchange of information from which each side could reach a position concerning the loss; disagreement could not simply be manufactured unilaterally before the insurer had the contractually required opportunity to investigate. Id. at 469–71.

Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Mango Hill Condominium Ass’n 12, Inc., 54 So. 3d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), applied that reasoning where the insured sought appraisal despite a dispute concerning compliance with post-loss obligations. The court acknowledged that trial courts may have discretion concerning the order in which some coverage and appraisal issues are resolved, but explained that such discretion does not eliminate the logically prior question whether an appraisable issue exists under the contract. Id. at 581–82.

Likewise, in State Farm Florida Insurance Co. v. Hernandez, 172 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), the Third District reversed an order compelling appraisal of a supplemental Hurricane Wilma claim where the insured had not satisfied pertinent contractual post-loss obligations. The important point is not that every Florida policy contains identical prerequisites or that every post-loss disagreement must necessarily be resolved in favor of the insurer before appraisal. Rather, the policy must be examined to determine what conditions the parties made part of the appraisal right, and material factual disputes concerning satisfaction of those conditions cannot simply be ignored because appraisal might eventually prove appropriate.

Thus, three questions that sometimes appear under the general heading of “appraisal” should not be conflated. Whether an appraisal provision has been triggered is a contractual question. What the appraisers may decide is a question concerning the scope of that provision. Whether appraisal should occur before or after a separate coverage determination is a question of sequencing. The Florida Supreme Court’s later decision in San Marco Villas principally addressed the third question.

San Marco Villas and the Rejection of a Mandatory Coverage-First Rule

Before 2024, Florida’s district courts were divided over whether a trial court could compel appraisal while an unresolved coverage dispute remained pending. Several Fourth District cases had adopted what amounted to a coverage-first rule, reasoning that coverage questions should be resolved judicially before the parties incurred the expense of appraisal. Other cases permitted appraisal to proceed before final determination of coverage.

The Florida Supreme Court resolved that conflict in American Coastal Insurance Co. v. San Marco Villas Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 379 So. 3d 1099 (Fla. 2024). The underlying dispute arose from Hurricane Irma damage to a condominium complex. The insurer had acknowledged hurricane damage, estimated the loss at approximately $356,000, and made a payment after depreciation and deductibles. The insured obtained an estimate exceeding $8 million and demanded appraisal. The insurer later asserted a fraud-and-misrepresentation defense that, if established, could void coverage altogether. The question presented was whether the existence of that unresolved coverage defense legally prohibited appraisal from proceeding first.

The Supreme Court’s analysis proceeded from the language of the policy. Because the parties plainly disagreed over the amount of loss caused by Hurricane Irma—a covered peril—the Court first concluded that the contractual condition giving rise to the right to appraisal had occurred. Only after reaching that conclusion did it address sequencing. The policy contained a retained-rights provision stating that the insurer retained its right to deny the claim even if an appraisal occurred. In the Court’s view, that language affirmatively contemplated the possibility of appraisal occurring before final adjudication of every coverage defense. Because the policy did not otherwise dictate the order in which those matters had to proceed, the trial court possessed discretion to determine the sequence. Id. at 1103–05.

The Court consequently disapproved Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Demetrescu, 137 So. 3d 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Michigan Condominium Ass’n, 46 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), and Sunshine State Insurance Co. v. Corridori, 28 So. 3d 129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), to the extent those decisions imposed an inflexible requirement that coverage always be resolved before appraisal. The Supreme Court found that the coverage-first approach lacked support in the policy language before it and rested in part on an overly broad reading of Johnson.

The Court’s treatment of Johnson is particularly important. Johnson determined who decides a particular type of causation dispute. It did not establish when that decision must be made in a case containing both a genuine amount-of-loss dispute and a separate coverage dispute. In Johnson, the insurer had wholly denied that there was a covered loss, leaving no separate amount-of-loss dispute for appraisal. Consequently, the Supreme Court explained in San Marco Villas, Johnson had never confronted the sequence in which concurrent judicial and appraisal issues should proceed. San Marco Villas, 379 So. 3d at 1104.

That distinction supplies much of the conceptual clarity missing from earlier cases. Saying that an appraisal panel lacks authority to decide whether fraud voided a policy does not necessarily mean the fraud issue must be adjudicated before appraisers calculate the amount of hurricane damage. Conversely, allowing appraisal to occur first does not authorize appraisers to adjudicate fraud, misrepresentation, policy interpretation, or other issues beyond the contractual appraisal clause. The appraisal award may establish the amount of loss while the insurer retains a judicial defense that, if successful, defeats its obligation to pay that amount.

San Marco Villas therefore establishes discretion, not an appraisal-first rule. The Supreme Court expressly declined to hold that appraisal must precede coverage whenever the two coexist. Indeed, it did not determine whether the particular trial court would have abused its discretion had that question properly been presented. The holding is instead that, where the contractual right to appraisal exists and the policy does not prescribe a mandatory sequence, the existence of a separate coverage issue does not itself deprive the trial court of authority to allow appraisal to proceed first. Id. at 1105.

A Challenge to the Enforceability of Appraisal Presents a Different Question

A materially different problem exists when the litigation does not merely present an independent coverage defense alongside an otherwise valid appraisal provision, but instead directly challenges the legal enforceability of the provision under which appraisal is sought. In that situation, simply compelling appraisal may assume the answer to the very question the court has been asked to adjudicate.

That problem was central to People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Marzouka, 320 So. 3d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). The insureds pleaded declaratory claims challenging provisions of a preferred-contractor endorsement, including the appraisal mechanism, as unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. The insurer moved to dismiss and sought to compel appraisal and repairs. The Third District recognized the general principle that trial courts ordinarily have discretion concerning the order of appraisal and coverage proceedings, but reasoned that no less discretion exists where the pending declaratory counts attack the enforceability of the appraisal provision itself. The trial court could determine whether those threshold matters should be adjudicated before appraisal and whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary. Id. at 948–49.

There is no inconsistency between Marzouka and San Marco Villas. In San Marco Villas, the Florida Supreme Court first determined that the policy gave the insured a presently existing contractual right to appraisal and then considered whether a distinct coverage defense had to be adjudicated before appraisal. Marzouka involved an attack on the enforceability of the contractual mechanism being invoked. The latter issue is logically anterior: a court cannot simply presume the enforceability of a disputed contractual provision in order to compel performance under it while a properly pleaded claim asks the court to determine whether that same provision is enforceable.

The continued vitality of Marzouka is not merely inferential. In Star Casualty Insurance Co. v. Dr. Car Glass, LLC, No. 3D25-1156 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 8, 2026), the Third District affirmed an appraisal-related ruling expressly on the authority of Marzouka, repeating its principle that where declaratory claims challenge the enforceability of an appraisal clause, the trial court may decide whether those matters should be addressed before appraisal and whether an evidentiary hearing is required. Although Star Casualty arose outside the homeowner-property setting, its express reliance on Marzouka confirms that the procedural proposition remains part of Third District law after San Marco Villas.

Declaratory Relief Cannot Be Converted Into a Merits Determination on a Motion to Dismiss

The reasoning in Marzouka also rests on a broader principle of Florida declaratory-judgment procedure. Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, authorizes courts to declare rights and legal relations and specifically permits judicial determination of questions concerning the construction or validity of written contracts. §§ 86.011, 86.021, Fla. Stat. (2026). The Legislature directs that the chapter be liberally administered to settle uncertainty concerning legal rights and relationships. § 86.101, Fla. Stat. (2026).

A motion to dismiss such a declaratory action ordinarily tests whether the plaintiff has alleged a bona fide controversy appropriate for declaratory relief. It does not ordinarily authorize the court to resolve against the plaintiff the substantive construction question for which the declaration was sought. That distinction was applied directly to an appraisal dispute in Express Damage Restoration, LLC v. First Community Insurance Co., 314 So. 3d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).

There, an assignee sought a declaration concerning whether charges for water-mitigation services fell within the policy’s “amount of loss” and were therefore subject to appraisal. The trial court dismissed the action after itself construing the policy and concluding that the charges were appraisable. The Third District reversed, reiterating that a motion to dismiss a declaratory-judgment complaint determines whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration, not whether the declaration ultimately should be favorable to the plaintiff. The court noted that the policy-construction issue might appropriately be decided through summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, but it could not be decided against the plaintiff merely by characterizing the complaint as legally insufficient. Id. at 534–35.

That principle derives from decisions such as Royal Selections, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 687 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), which similarly held that a court may not dismiss a declaratory action by deciding the very construction question the complaint asks it to declare. The distinction is procedural rather than substantive. Nothing prevents a court from ultimately rejecting the plaintiff’s interpretation as a matter of law when the case reaches a procedural posture permitting a merits determination. What is improper is using a four-corners motion to dismiss as the functional equivalent of summary judgment without employing the procedure applicable to an adjudication on the merits.

Marzouka thus contains a lesson extending beyond insurance appraisal. When the requested relief requires judicial construction of disputed contractual provisions, a court should distinguish the sufficiency of the pleaded declaratory controversy from the merits of the construction sought. Compelling performance under the disputed provision while simultaneously dismissing or effectively deciding the declaratory challenge may collapse those separate inquiries in a manner inconsistent with ordinary Florida civil procedure.

The Separate Doctrine Governing an Insurer’s Election to Repair

The preferred-contractor endorsement at issue in Marzouka implicates another established body of Florida insurance law. Property policies may give an insurer the option to discharge its obligation not by making a cash loss payment but by electing to repair the damaged property. Florida statutes expressly recognize that form of coverage. Section 627.7011(6)(e), Florida Statutes (2026), provides that the homeowners’ replacement-cost statute does not prohibit an insurer from exercising a contractual right to repair in compliance with the policy and section 627.702(7). The latter provision similarly states that Florida’s valued-policy law does not prohibit an insurer from repairing or replacing damaged property at its own expense, subject to the statutory qualifications.

The consequences of an election to repair have been recognized in Florida for decades. In Drew v. Mobile USA Insurance Co., 920 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), the Fourth District explained that a valid exercise of an option to repair may create a new contractual obligation to perform the repairs and restore the damaged property substantially to its pre-loss condition within a reasonable time. Because the insurer’s obligation after election is one of performance rather than merely payment of a specified policy benefit, breach of that repair obligation may have consequences different from an ordinary failure to pay insurance proceeds. Id. at 835–36.

Later cases applying preferred-contractor endorsements have developed that principle. In People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Franco, 305 So. 3d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), and subsequent cases, the Third District described the contractual relationship resulting from an election to repair as a “Drew agreement.” The insurer’s timely election changes the character of the performance owed: rather than simply tendering money for the covered loss, the insurer becomes obligated to accomplish the covered repairs in accordance with the contract.

This distinction also explains why an appraisal award does not invariably create an unconditional right to receive the dollar amount of the award in cash. In People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Tosar, 332 So. 3d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), the insurer timely exercised its right under a preferred-contractor endorsement to repair covered Hurricane Irma damage. An appraisal later determined the amount of loss and scope of repairs. The trial court ordered the insurer to pay the appraisal amount, but the Third District reversed because the policy provided for repair in lieu of a loss payment. Once appraisal established the scope of work, the insureds were contractually required to authorize the preferred contractor to perform the repairs and to satisfy the applicable deductible. Id. at 559–61.

The Fourth District reached a comparable conclusion in People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. First Call 24/7, Inc., 333 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). After the insurer accepted coverage and timely elected repair, the homeowner failed to provide the work authorization necessary for the preferred contractor to perform the remaining covered repairs and instead used another contractor. The court reversed the resulting monetary judgment against the insurer, explaining that allowing a cash recovery under those circumstances would nullify the contractual right-to-repair option.

Similarly, Castro v. People’s Trust Insurance Co., 315 So. 3d 761 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), affirmed summary judgment where the insured failed to execute the required work authorization and refused to pay the deductible after the insurer exercised its repair option. The insured had also argued that the provision violated section 627.7011, lacked adequate consideration, and was unconscionable. The Fourth District stated that it affirmed on all issues but wrote principally to address the statutory and material-breach questions. Id. at 763–66. That distinction is worth preserving: Castro supports the enforceability of the judgment before it, but the published opinion should not be expanded into a detailed appellate analysis of unconscionability that the court itself did not undertake.

The Right to Repair Imposes Duties on the Insurer as Well as the Insured

The right-to-repair cases should not be read as giving the insurer a unilateral option without corresponding obligations. Once an insurer validly elects repair, the election may bind both parties. The insured may be required to cooperate, provide access, execute appropriate authorizations, pay the contractual deductible, and permit the selected contractor to undertake the work. But the insurer, having elected performance rather than payment, assumes the obligation associated with that election.

Drew illustrates the other side of the doctrine. If the insurer undertakes the contractual repair obligation but fails adequately or timely to restore the property, the resulting dispute is not necessarily confined to whether the insurer originally acknowledged coverage. The insured may possess a breach claim arising from the repair undertaking itself. Drew recognized that an insurer’s breach of the new repair contract could support damages proximately resulting from that breach, subject to ordinary limitations on contract damages. 920 So. 2d at 835–36.

This mutuality is important when analyzing preferred-contractor provisions. Florida cases enforcing an insured’s cooperation obligations generally involve circumstances in which the insurer timely exercised the option and remained prepared to perform the covered repairs. They should not be transformed into a rule that the insured must acquiesce to any demand labeled an election to repair regardless of the policy’s terms, the timeliness of the election, the scope of the proposed work, or the insurer’s subsequent performance.

The more recent cases continue to emphasize the contractual details. In People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Lamolli, 352 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), the trial court had concluded that the insurer’s preferred general contractor could not perform roofing repairs because it was not itself a licensed roofing contractor. The Fourth District reversed, holding that the policy did not prohibit the general contractor from performing the covered work through appropriately licensed subcontractors. The decision turned on what the policy and governing law permitted, rather than on a categorical rule concerning preferred contractors.

In People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Hernandez, 400 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024), the Third District addressed the insured’s prolonged failure to provide a work authorization after the insurer’s election to repair and an appraisal fixing the scope of repairs. The court reversed a judgment for the insured and directed entry of a verdict for the insurer, relying on the contractual requirement to authorize the repair work and evidence of resulting prejudice, including increased repair costs, failure to mitigate, and the insured’s independent performance of part of the repairs.

At the same time, Restoration Construction, LLC v. People’s Trust Insurance Co., 388 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024), illustrates the factual and contractual complexity that may remain in these disputes. The majority affirmed without a written merits analysis, while Judge Warner’s dissent would have found issues concerning the operation of the endorsement and waiver. Because the dissent does not state controlling law, it should not be treated as altering Tosar, First Call, or Castro. It nevertheless demonstrates why right-to-repair litigation often depends heavily on the precise policy language, the sequence of communications, the conduct of the parties, and whether the insurer’s ability to perform was actually impaired.

Appraisal and the Right to Repair Intersect but Remain Distinct

Preferred-contractor policies demonstrate particularly well why appraisal doctrine cannot be reduced to a dispute over the amount of a check. Under a conventional loss-payment policy, determining the amount of loss may lead directly to a payment obligation, subject to deductibles, limits, coverage defenses, and other policy provisions. Under a valid election-to-repair endorsement, however, appraisal may instead determine the scope and amount of work the insurer or its contractor must perform.

That was the structure enforced in Tosar. Appraisal established the covered repair scope, but the award did not erase the insurer’s prior election to repair or convert the policy into one requiring a cash payment. Similarly, where the policy authorizes appraisal of both the amount of loss and the scope of repairs, the appraisers’ determination may define the performance required under the ensuing repair relationship without resolving legal questions concerning the validity of the endorsement or whether one party later breached that relationship.

This separation of functions is consistent with Licea, Johnson, and San Marco Villas. Appraisers determine the matters contractually assigned to them. Courts determine questions of policy construction, legal coverage, enforceability, and contractual breach that remain outside the appraisal submission. The fact that an appraisal award may have important consequences for subsequent litigation does not enlarge the appraisers’ contractual authority.

An Enforceability Challenge Is Not a Holding of Unenforceability

The distinction is particularly important in understanding Marzouka. The decision did not hold that preferred-contractor endorsements are categorically unconscionable, invalid, or unenforceable. Nor did it hold that the particular insureds ultimately would prevail on their challenges. It held that properly pleaded challenges to the enforceability of the provisions could not simply be bypassed by compelling performance under the very provisions whose validity remained to be adjudicated.

Subsequent decisions enforcing right-to-repair endorsements underscore that point. Castro, Amaro, Tosar, First Call, Lamolli, and Hernandez demonstrate that Florida appellate courts will enforce such provisions when the contractual requirements for the insurer’s election have been satisfied and the factual circumstances support enforcement. People’s Trust Insurance Co. v. Amaro, 319 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), for example, enforced the consequences of an election where the insured sold the property before the preferred contractor could perform and thereby made the contemplated repair impossible. The continued vitality of Amaro was reflected as recently as September 10, 2026, when the Third District issued a per curiam affirmance citing it as controlling authority in Wolf v. People’s Trust Insurance Co., No. 3D25-0434; that opinion remained subject to the ordinary rehearing period when issued.

Accordingly, Marzouka is best understood as a decision about judicial authority, procedural regularity, and contractual enforceability—not as a substantive condemnation of preferred-contractor endorsements. It requires courts to adjudicate genuine enforceability disputes through an appropriate procedure before assuming the validity of a contested provision when enforcement of that provision would effectively decide the pending controversy.

The Current Florida Framework

Viewed together, the cases establish a coherent body of law even though the results of individual appraisal disputes remain highly dependent on policy language and facts.

The policy first determines whether the parties have contracted for appraisal and what circumstances activate that remedy. A court asked to compel appraisal must therefore consider whether the contractual prerequisites have occurred and, when genuinely disputed, whether factual questions concerning those prerequisites require adjudication. Decisions such as Romay, Mango Hill, and Hernandez reflect this threshold inquiry.

If the contractual right to appraisal exists, the next inquiry concerns the boundary between appraisal and judicial decision-making. Licea and Johnson teach that amount-of-loss determinations belong to appraisers to the extent provided by the contract, even though valuation may require factual judgments concerning the extent of damage attributable to an admitted covered peril. Questions concerning whether the claimed loss is covered at all, whether policy conditions have been violated in a manner defeating coverage, and other legal matters outside the appraisal clause remain for the court.

When both categories of dispute coexist, San Marco Villas rejects a categorical rule dictating that every coverage question must precede appraisal. Where the contractual language permits appraisal and does not prescribe sequencing, particularly where the policy expressly preserves coverage defenses following appraisal, the trial court possesses discretion to determine the order in which the matters should proceed. The distinction is between the authority to decide an issue and the chronology in which authorized decisionmakers act.

A different problem exists when the contractual provision authorizing appraisal is itself challenged as legally unenforceable. Marzouka, expressly relied upon by the Third District again in 2026, recognizes the trial court’s authority to address such a threshold challenge before compelling appraisal and to determine whether factual issues require an evidentiary hearing. The court should not use enforcement of the disputed provision as a substitute for adjudicating its validity.

Finally, an insurer’s election to repair adds another contractual layer. Florida law recognizes the validity of such arrangements, and the statutes expressly preserve an insurer’s ability to repair damaged property when the policy so provides. Once properly exercised, the election may create binding obligations on both sides: the insured may be required to cooperate with the repair process, while the insurer assumes the contractual obligation to accomplish the covered repairs. Appraisal may determine the amount and scope of that work without converting the insurer’s repair obligation into a cash-payment obligation or resolving separate questions concerning contractual breach.

Conclusion

Florida property-insurance appraisal law is most accurately understood as a system for allocating different categories of disputes among different decisionmakers while preserving the primacy of the insurance contract. The recurring mistake is to treat every controversy as presenting a single question—whether “coverage” or “appraisal” comes first. The modern cases require a more discriminating analysis.

A court must first determine what the parties agreed to and whether the contractual right to appraisal has arisen. It must then distinguish the amount-of-loss questions committed to appraisal from legal and coverage questions reserved for judicial determination. If both kinds of dispute coexist, San Marco Villas permits the trial court, absent controlling contractual language, to exercise discretion over sequencing rather than mechanically applying a coverage-first rule. If the enforceability of the appraisal provision itself is disputed, Marzouka recognizes that the court may have to adjudicate that antecedent issue before compelling contractual performance. And where the insurer has validly elected to repair, the appraisal award must be understood within the separate contractual framework created by that election rather than automatically treated as an entitlement to a cash payment.

The unifying principle is therefore not appraisal itself, but contract. Florida law uses appraisal to resolve the valuation questions the parties agreed to submit to appraisers while preserving the judiciary’s responsibility for questions of legal coverage, contractual construction, enforceability, and breach. San Marco Villas clarified the sequencing of those proceedings, but it did not erase the distinctions on which Licea, Johnson, Romay, and Marzouka depend. Taken together, those decisions provide a substantially more coherent framework for Florida property-insurance litigation than a simple rule requiring either appraisal or coverage to invariably come first.

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