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When Lawsuits Become Assets: Litigation Finance, Private Equity, and the Return of Champerty

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By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

September 23, 2026

For centuries, Anglo-American law was suspicious of strangers acquiring financial interests in other people’s lawsuits. The concern was not difficult to understand. Litigation was supposed to resolve actual disputes between parties whose rights and obligations were genuinely at stake. Once an outsider could finance a lawsuit in exchange for a portion of the recovery, however, that outsider acquired an economic interest in whether the lawsuit was filed, how aggressively it was litigated, whether it was settled, and how much money ultimately changed hands. The judicial system could therefore become not merely a forum for resolving disputes, but a marketplace in which claims themselves were financial assets.

The common-law doctrines of maintenance and champerty developed in significant part in response to that concern. Maintenance generally referred to the improper support of litigation by a person who had no legitimate interest in the controversy. Champerty was a particular form of maintenance in which an outsider financed or supported litigation in return for a share of the property or recovery obtained through the lawsuit. The doctrines evolved differently across jurisdictions, and the historical law was hardly uniform, but the underlying policy concern was clear: permitting strangers to purchase interests in lawsuits could encourage speculative litigation and create incentives inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.

American law gradually retreated from an absolute version of that principle. Contingent attorney fees became accepted, largely because they allowed people without sufficient resources to obtain legal representation and enforce otherwise valid claims. Over time, contingency-fee representation became an ordinary and heavily regulated feature of American civil litigation.

But modern litigation finance goes considerably further. A lawsuit today may be financed not simply by the lawyer representing the client, but by sophisticated commercial enterprises that evaluate legal claims as investments. Funders may invest in a single lawsuit, a portfolio of cases, a law firm’s contingent-fee inventory, or businesses that provide management and financing services to law firms. Private-equity and other institutional investors increasingly seek economic exposure to legal practices through financing arrangements, management-services organizations, and other structures designed to operate alongside professional rules restricting nonlawyer ownership and fee sharing.

The terminology is modern. The underlying economic problem is remarkably old.

That makes the ancient law of champerty newly relevant. The serious question is not whether twenty-first-century litigation finance is technically identical to every transaction prohibited by medieval English law. Obviously it is not. The more important question is whether the policies underlying the old rules deserve renewed attention when investors who owe no professional duties to litigants acquire substantial economic interests in litigation.

The Original Concern Was the Creation of an Interest in the Lawsuit

The history of champerty is sometimes dismissed as an obscure artifact of medieval English law. That characterization understates the seriousness with which American courts continued to treat the doctrine well into the nineteenth century.

In Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624 (1897), for example, the United States Supreme Court considered an arrangement under which an attorney would prosecute litigation at his own expense and receive a portion of the property recovered. Applying the common law then prevailing in the District of Columbia, the Court held the arrangement unlawful and void for champerty. The Court explained that an attorney’s agreement to conduct litigation “on his own account,” pay its expenses, and receive a portion of the recovery was objectionable because it transformed the attorney into a participant in the disputed property itself. The Court expressly described such arrangements as contrary to public policy because of their tendency to “stir up baseless litigation.”

The facts of Peck are more than a historical curiosity. Economically, the transaction is recognizable today. Someone supplied the resources necessary to pursue a claim. In exchange, that person received a contingent participation in the proceeds. The investment succeeded only if the litigation succeeded.

Modern litigation finance performs the same basic economic function, although today the investor may be a specialized fund rather than an individual lawyer, and the investment may be subjected to sophisticated underwriting, portfolio diversification, financial modeling, and institutional capital allocation. The scale and technology have changed dramatically. The basic proposition—that a person may invest money or services into litigation in anticipation of a return contingent on its outcome—has not.

That historical comparison should not be overstated. Champerty law varied substantially among jurisdictions, and the common law itself evolved. Nevertheless, it is difficult to read Peck without recognizing the similarity between the nineteenth-century concern and the modern litigation-finance model. The Court was not merely worried about some technical transfer of title. It was worried about what happens when litigation becomes an economic enterprise for someone who would otherwise have no interest in the underlying dispute.

How Contingency Fees Became an Accepted Exception

The eventual acceptance of contingency fees reflected a competing policy concern: access to counsel.

Litigation has always been expensive, and an absolute rule forbidding any contingent compensation could prevent legitimate claims from being prosecuted simply because the claimant lacked money. American courts therefore began distinguishing between improper speculation in litigation and compensation arrangements that allowed lawyers to represent clients who could not otherwise afford their services.

The Supreme Court’s nineteenth-century cases involving attorneys prosecuting claims against the federal government illustrate the competing considerations. In Ball v. Halsell, 161 U.S. 72 (1896), the Court dealt with an agreement under which an attorney claimed a portion of a recovery for prosecuting an Indian-depredation claim. The particular agreement ultimately could not be enforced because Congress had imposed statutory restrictions on assignments and attorney compensation in those claims. But the broader legal developments of the period demonstrate the emerging recognition that some contingent compensation arrangements served a legitimate function by allowing claimants to secure representation without paying substantial fees in advance.

The tension became explicit in Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920). There, the Supreme Court recognized both the practical justification for contingent compensation and the dangers associated with it. Contingent fees could make representation possible for persons who otherwise might not be able to obtain professional assistance. At the same time, Congress could reasonably regulate such arrangements because excessive contingent compensation could encourage improper solicitation, speculative claims, or other abuses.

That tension remains embedded in contingency practice today. The arrangement solves one financial problem by deliberately creating another economic incentive. The lawyer assumes the risk of nonpayment and, in exchange, acquires an economic interest in the outcome of the litigation.

There is, however, an important distinction between the traditional contingent-fee lawyer and an outside investor. The lawyer is not merely an investor. The lawyer is a regulated professional who owes fiduciary and ethical duties directly to the client. The lawyer must preserve confidentiality, avoid prohibited conflicts of interest, exercise independent professional judgment, communicate with the client, and respect the client’s ultimate authority over important decisions such as settlement. The lawyer is also subject to professional discipline and, depending on the circumstances, malpractice liability and judicial supervision.

Those protections do not eliminate the economic incentive created by a contingent fee. A contingent-fee lawyer plainly benefits financially from a larger recovery and may suffer financially from unsuccessful litigation. But professional regulation at least attempts to subordinate that financial interest to the lawyer’s duties to the client.

That distinction becomes critical when the economic interest is transferred to a third party that owes no comparable professional duties.

From Financing a Client to Investing in an Asset

Modern third-party litigation funding takes several forms. A funder may advance money to an individual claimant who needs funds for living expenses while a personal-injury action remains pending. A commercial litigation funder may finance attorneys’ fees, experts, discovery, or other expenses associated with a substantial business dispute. A funder may invest directly in a portfolio of cases handled by a law firm. Still other financing structures may provide working capital to firms with significant contingent-fee inventories.

The economics vary, but the essential feature is generally similar: the funder provides capital now in exchange for a return tied, directly or indirectly, to the proceeds of litigation. That return may be calculated as a percentage of recovery, a multiple of invested capital, a time-dependent return, or some combination of those methods.

From a financial perspective, this transforms litigation into something capable of being underwritten as an investment. A funder can estimate the probability of liability, the expected value of damages, projected attorneys’ fees and costs, the likely duration of the proceeding, collectability, appellate risk, jurisdictional tendencies, and settlement probabilities. A portfolio of unrelated claims can be diversified so that losses on unsuccessful cases are offset by gains elsewhere.

There is nothing irrational about that analysis. Investors are supposed to evaluate risk and expected return. That is what capital markets do.

But a lawsuit is not an ordinary financial instrument. The asset being evaluated exists inside a judicial process. The investment depends upon decisions made by courts, juries, lawyers, witnesses, experts, and opposing parties. The conduct financed by the investor is constrained by rules of procedure and professional responsibility. Most importantly, the person whose legal rights are being litigated may have interests that are not identical to the investor’s objective of maximizing financial return.

That distinction is at the heart of the ethical problem.

The Investor’s Incentives Are Rational—And That Is Precisely the Point

It is easy to frame the debate over litigation funding in moralistic terms and thereby miss the real issue. One need not assume that litigation funders are dishonest, unscrupulous, or intent on interfering with lawyers. The problem exists even when everyone acts rationally.

Suppose a funder invests $5 million in a substantial commercial case. The funder necessarily cares about the case. It cares whether another $1 million should be spent on expert discovery. It cares whether the plaintiff should accept a $12 million settlement. It cares whether the case should proceed through trial, whether an adverse judgment should be appealed, and whether additional claims should be pursued. It cares how long its capital will remain committed and what return it will receive when the litigation ends.

Those concerns are not improper from the investor’s perspective. They are precisely the concerns a rational investor should have.

The difficulty is that those concerns may not coincide with the client’s.

A client may wish to settle because years of litigation have become personally or commercially exhausting even though continued litigation has a positive expected monetary value. Another client may wish to reject a financially rational settlement because vindication, precedent, reputation, confidentiality, or some nonmonetary objective matters greatly to that client. A business may value preserving a commercial relationship more than extracting every available dollar from a claim. An individual may simply want litigation to end.

An investment fund evaluates those considerations differently because its principal reason for participating in the lawsuit is financial return.

Ethics authorities have recognized this conflict for years. New York City Bar Formal Opinion 2011-2 observed that third-party funding is not unethical per se but can raise serious questions concerning confidentiality, privilege, and the lawyer’s independent professional judgment. The opinion identified the core economic tension directly: because the financier’s investment decision depends on the likelihood and magnitude of recovery, the financier has an understandable interest in obtaining information and may develop views about how the case should be conducted.

The ethical solution is generally expressed as a prohibition on funder control. The lawyer must continue to exercise independent professional judgment, and the funder should not dictate litigation strategy or settlement.

That principle is necessary. Whether it is sufficient is another matter.

Control Is Not the Same Thing as Influence

Much regulation in this area focuses on formal authority. Does the funder possess a contractual veto over settlement? Can the funder select counsel? Can it compel the lawyer to pursue or abandon a particular strategy? Does it possess the legal right to approve litigation expenditures?

Those are important questions, but influence does not require an express contractual veto.

A law firm that has obtained substantial financing from an outside investor may expect to seek additional financing in the future. A litigation fund that has committed millions of dollars to a portfolio may communicate regularly with lawyers about budgets, case developments, and expected recoveries. A management company may supply a law firm with technology, advertising, staffing, office infrastructure, intake systems, and operating capital.

In each situation, the lawyer may formally retain complete professional independence. But economic dependence can exist even where legal control does not.

Imagine a law firm that relies upon a financier for enough capital to support hundreds of contingent-fee cases. The funding agreement may say unequivocally that the financier has no settlement authority. Yet if the financier announces that it considers the firm’s settlement performance inadequate, that it is concerned about escalating litigation expenditures, or that continued capital availability depends upon portfolio performance, it would be unrealistic to pretend that the communication has no potential influence merely because the investor cannot technically sign the settlement agreement.

The law has long recognized that substantive influence can exist without formal ownership. Legal ethics should be equally realistic about financial relationships.

Florida’s Rules Reflect the Traditional Concern With Professional Independence

Florida’s professional-conduct rules remain grounded in the traditional proposition that professional legal judgment must remain with lawyers representing clients.

Rule 4-5.4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar generally prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers and restricts partnerships and professional arrangements that allow nonlawyers to own or control legal practices. The rule is expressly directed toward the “Professional Independence of a Lawyer.” The organizing principle is not difficult to identify: a person who does not owe the professional obligations of a lawyer should not acquire financial leverage that compromises the lawyer’s independent judgment.

Florida has also addressed litigation funding more directly.

Florida Ethics Opinion 00-3 considered arrangements in which funding companies offered nonrecourse advances to personal-injury clients in exchange for assignments of portions of eventual litigation proceeds. The opinion concluded that a lawyer may, under appropriate circumstances, provide a client with information concerning such companies and may provide factual information concerning the client’s case with informed consent. It also recognized that a lawyer may honor a client’s valid written assignment of a portion of the recovery.

But the opinion was deliberately cautious. The Florida Bar expressly stated that nothing in the opinion should be viewed as endorsing litigation-funding companies or their use. It emphasized the lawyer’s duties concerning confidentiality, conflicts, and the client’s interests and declined to determine whether particular financing transactions were legally valid.

Florida case law likewise demonstrates why simplistic statements about champerty should be avoided. In Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the Fourth District considered a funding arrangement connected to litigation and rejected the argument that the transaction was necessarily unenforceable as champertous under the circumstances presented. The decision illustrates that modern Florida law does not impose an across-the-board common-law prohibition on every agreement by which a third party obtains a contingent financial interest connected to litigation.

That does not make the underlying policy concern irrelevant. It simply means that the question has shifted. Instead of asking whether every outside financial interest is automatically prohibited, modern professional regulation increasingly asks what rights, influence, incentives, disclosures, and protections accompany the investment.

Private Equity Raises the Same Issue at a Larger Scale

Third-party funding of an individual lawsuit is only one part of the development. The more consequential structural issue may be outside investment in the economics surrounding law firms themselves.

Most American jurisdictions continue to restrict nonlawyer ownership of traditional law firms and the sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers. Investors therefore generally cannot purchase a Florida law firm in the same manner that a private-equity fund might purchase a dental practice, veterinary chain, insurance brokerage, or other professional-services business.

But financial engineering does not end merely because direct ownership is restricted.

Investor-backed entities can provide law firms with capital, management services, technology, staffing, marketing, client-intake infrastructure, administrative services, office space, and other operational support. A management-services organization, or MSO, may own or provide many of the business functions surrounding a professional practice while the law firm itself remains formally owned by lawyers.

Such a structure can be entirely legitimate if properly organized. The significant question is not what the entities are called. It is where the economic leverage resides.

A law firm may technically remain lawyer-owned while becoming heavily dependent upon an outside entity for capital, marketing, case acquisition, technology, staffing, or administrative infrastructure. If a management organization receives substantial compensation tied in some fashion to the firm’s economic performance, the practical relationship between the professional entity and the investor can become considerably more complicated than the ownership chart suggests.

That is why the growth of investor-backed legal-service structures has attracted increasing regulatory attention.

California Has Now Addressed the Issue Directly

California provided a striking example in September 2026.

Governor Gavin Newsom signed Assembly Bill 2305, legislation specifically addressing corporate funding and influence in litigation practices. The law applies to contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2027, and prohibits defined corporate legal funders from interfering with or attempting to influence an attorney’s or litigant’s independent professional judgment concerning substantive litigation decisions.

The statute is unusually specific about what that means. Among other things, it identifies decisions concerning client selection, scope of representation, financial terms of representation, litigation strategy, filing or dismissing claims, settlement, evidence, discovery, appeals, and litigation timing. It also prohibits investor control over functions such as selecting counsel based upon profit maximization rather than client interests, establishing financial incentives that compromise attorney independence, making funding or budgeting decisions that affect case strategy, and requiring litigation decisions to be based upon investor-return metrics rather than client objectives and professional ethics.

Those provisions are important because they identify the precise collision between investment logic and professional logic.

A rational investment manager does use return metrics to allocate capital. A rational investment manager does evaluate expenditures against expected value. A rational investor does prefer business practices that maximize profitability.

California has now effectively said that those ordinary investment principles reach a boundary when they begin determining how a lawyer litigates a client’s case.

The statute does not prohibit all outside capital. Nor does it categorically prohibit nonrecourse litigation finance. Instead, it attempts to separate permissible financing from impermissible influence. The law also specifically reaches ownership, management, service, and financing arrangements rather than focusing solely on one particular corporate form.

Whether California’s approach proves effective remains to be seen. But the legislation is important for a broader reason: it demonstrates that the concern over outside financial influence on litigation is not theoretical. A major jurisdiction has concluded that the issue is sufficiently concrete to warrant a detailed statutory boundary between capital and professional judgment.

In conceptual terms, that boundary is remarkably close to the concern that animated champerty doctrine.

The Industrialization of Contingency Litigation

The concern becomes more pronounced when litigation is conducted on a large portfolio basis.

Modern technology and advertising can generate enormous volumes of potential claimants. Television advertising, internet marketing, social-media campaigns, search-engine advertising, lead-generation companies, call centers, automated intake systems, and data analytics can identify and process thousands of prospective clients. Cases meeting specified criteria can be aggregated and evaluated as a portfolio.

Again, none of that establishes that the underlying claims lack merit. Mass torts, product-liability claims, consumer cases, and other aggregated litigation may involve genuine injuries and valid legal rights.

The structural point is different.

Traditional legal representation begins with a person who has a problem and seeks a lawyer. Industrialized litigation can invert that sequence. Capital can be deployed to identify potential claims, acquire leads, screen claimants, finance case development, and assemble large inventories of litigation.

Once that occurs, the economic value may no longer lie solely in any individual client’s case. The portfolio itself becomes an asset.

A firm handling thousands of contingent claims can estimate expected recoveries across categories. Financing can be advanced against anticipated fee streams. Advertising expenditures can be evaluated according to client-acquisition cost. Cases can be sorted according to projected value, jurisdiction, injury category, procedural stage, or expected duration. Settlement proceeds from one group of cases can finance acquisition and prosecution of others.

At sufficient scale, litigation begins to resemble an operating business whose inventory happens to consist of legal claims.

The ancient concern about “stirring up litigation” sounds considerably less quaint when viewed against that economic model. The question is no longer merely whether a financially distressed plaintiff can obtain enough money to hire a lawyer. It becomes whether sophisticated capital can profit by creating systems designed to locate, aggregate, finance, and monetize legal claims on an industrial scale.

Those are very different propositions.

Settlement Exposes the Conflict Most Clearly

Settlement may provide the best illustration of the competing incentives.

Under ordinary principles of legal ethics, the decision whether to accept a settlement ultimately belongs to the client. The lawyer advises the client regarding risks, value, evidence, expense, and strategy, but the client decides whether to resolve the claim.

Introduce a third-party investor and another constituency now has an economic interest in that decision.

Suppose a funder invested $1 million and is entitled to a return that makes a proposed $8 million settlement highly profitable. The funder may rationally favor settlement even though the client, for legitimate reasons, believes the case should proceed to trial.

Reverse the circumstances. Suppose a settlement would provide the client with enough money to accomplish every practical objective the client had when litigation began. The funder, however, believes that another year of litigation creates a sufficiently high probability of doubling the recovery to justify continuing. The client’s preference for finality may be economically irrational from the investor’s perspective.

Neither side must be acting in bad faith for the conflict to arise. Their objectives simply differ.

Professional-conduct rules generally resolve the formal issue by preserving the client’s settlement authority and the lawyer’s independent judgment. That is the correct rule. But once substantial outside capital enters the relationship, the practical question becomes how effectively those principles can withstand economic pressure.

One should be cautious about assuming that contractual language eliminating a formal settlement veto eliminates every relevant conflict.

Confidentiality Creates Another Structural Tension

The investor’s need for information creates a separate problem.

No sophisticated financier would invest substantial money into litigation blindly. Before committing capital, the funder understandably wants to assess liability, damages, defenses, expert evidence, litigation strategy, procedural history, settlement posture, opposing counsel, venue, collectability, and appellate risk. After financing is provided, the investor may want regular information concerning developments that affect the investment.

Much of the most valuable information for that analysis may also be confidential, privileged, or protected work product.

Ethics authorities have therefore repeatedly warned lawyers to consider carefully what information may be provided to potential or existing funders. The client’s informed consent may be necessary before confidential information is disclosed, and disclosure to outsiders may create privilege or work-product issues depending upon the governing law and circumstances.

The conflict is again structural rather than accidental. The investor cannot intelligently price risk without information. The legal system protects certain information because the attorney-client relationship depends upon confidentiality.

Litigation finance places those two principles in tension.

The Disclosure Question Remains Unsettled

A related controversy concerns whether opposing parties and courts should know when outside investors possess financial interests in litigation.

There are legitimate arguments against broad disclosure. A litigant ordinarily is not required to disclose every source of financing used to pay attorneys’ fees. Corporate defendants may finance litigation through operating revenue, insurance, credit facilities, or other sources without exposing every economic arrangement to an adversary. Plaintiffs reasonably argue that litigation funding should not automatically become a discovery sideshow.

The counterargument is that a third party’s contingent financial interest may implicate issues that ordinary financing does not. Depending upon the circumstances, the funder’s identity or contractual rights may bear upon conflicts of interest, standing, control, settlement authority, discovery, sanctions, privilege, or the identification of persons possessing a substantial economic interest in the outcome.

American jurisdictions have not adopted a single comprehensive approach. Disclosure obligations remain dependent upon particular court rules, standing orders, statutes, discovery standards, and the facts of individual cases.

As the amount of institutional capital invested in litigation increases, the pressure to resolve that issue more systematically will almost certainly continue.

The Strongest Defense of Litigation Finance Cannot Simply Be Dismissed

A fair analysis must acknowledge the strongest argument for litigation finance: money affects access to justice.

Meritorious litigation can be extraordinarily expensive. Expert witnesses, electronic discovery, depositions, document review, travel, trial preparation, demonstrative evidence, and appellate proceedings can consume enormous resources. A well-capitalized defendant may be capable of sustaining years of litigation that would financially exhaust an individual claimant or small company.

Third-party capital can reduce that imbalance.

A business with a strong commercial claim may also rationally prefer to invest its own capital in employees, equipment, acquisitions, or operations rather than tie millions of dollars up in litigation expenses for several years. Litigation funding allows that company to transfer part of the financial risk of litigation to another party.

There is nothing inherently illegitimate about either objective.

Indeed, eliminating all outside financing could sometimes produce the opposite of justice by allowing the party with greater financial resources to prevail through attrition rather than legal merit.

But acknowledging that benefit does not resolve the ethical problem. Capital can correct a resource imbalance while simultaneously creating new conflicts of interest. Those propositions are not mutually exclusive.

The meaningful policy question is therefore not whether litigation finance can ever be beneficial. Clearly it can. The question is what limitations should accompany capital once the investor’s financial interest begins affecting litigation decisions, professional independence, client relationships, confidentiality, or the creation and acquisition of claims.

The Historical Irony Is Difficult to Ignore

The most interesting feature of the contemporary debate is how familiar the issues would have appeared to nineteenth-century judges.

They worried that people who had no original interest in a controversy might acquire financial interests in litigation.

Modern litigation funders do precisely that.

They worried that financial participation could encourage the prosecution of claims for speculative profit.

Modern investment funds expressly evaluate litigation according to expected financial return.

They worried that a person funding litigation could become interested in controlling or influencing the way the case was prosecuted.

Modern ethics opinions and statutes repeatedly insist that funders must not control or interfere with lawyer judgment.

They worried that litigation could become an enterprise conducted partly for the account of someone other than the actual litigant.

Modern litigation portfolios can be financed, diversified, valued, and managed as investments.

This does not prove that the common-law prohibition should simply be restored in its historical form. The world has changed, litigation economics have changed, and absolute rules can create serious unintended consequences.

But it does suggest that the people who developed champerty doctrine had identified a genuine problem rather than an irrational medieval superstition.

They understood that economic ownership creates incentives.

Modern financial theory would hardly disagree.

The Exception May Be Swallowing the Rule

The historical development can be viewed as a series of incremental steps.

First, the law tolerated contingent attorney compensation because otherwise some legitimate claimants could not obtain counsel.

Then the lawyer could advance certain litigation costs subject to professional rules.

Then outside companies could advance money to litigants against prospective recoveries.

Then commercial funders began financing substantial litigation directly.

Then funders began financing portfolios of cases.

Then outside capital began financing law firms and businesses operating around law firms.

Then sophisticated investors began exploring structures through which capital could participate in legal-service economics without formally owning the professional entity.

Each step can be defended individually.

Viewed together, however, they represent a major transformation in the relationship between capital and litigation.

The justification for a lawyer representing an indigent or financially constrained client on contingency does not necessarily answer whether an investment fund should obtain economic exposure to hundreds of lawsuits. The need to finance expert witnesses in one commercial dispute does not necessarily answer whether private capital should finance an entire litigation enterprise. The fact that a law firm may legitimately hire an outside company to provide payroll or information technology does not answer how much economic influence an investor-backed management company should be permitted to exercise over the practice.

At some point, the original access-to-justice rationale becomes too narrow to justify every subsequent development.

Lawyers and Investors Occupy Different Institutional Roles

The fundamental distinction is not that investors are bad and lawyers are good. Lawyers plainly have financial interests of their own, and lawyers are perfectly capable of behaving improperly.

The distinction is institutional.

A lawyer owes professional duties to the client and operates within a regulatory system designed, however imperfectly, to enforce those duties. An investor generally owes duties to the investor’s own stakeholders and legitimately seeks an economic return on invested capital.

Those obligations can coexist when boundaries are clear.

Problems arise when the investor’s economic incentives begin governing decisions that the legal system assigns to lawyers and clients.

That is why rules concerning fee sharing, nonlawyer ownership, confidentiality, settlement authority, conflicts of interest, and independent professional judgment all converge on the same underlying principle: legal representation cannot be treated entirely as an ordinary commercial enterprise because the lawyer’s function is not simply to maximize revenue.

The lawyer represents someone else.

That relationship necessarily places limits on what pure investment logic can dictate.

Perhaps Champerty Was Not Such an Antiquated Idea

Modern lawyers sometimes speak about champerty as though it belongs in the same category as trial by ordeal or other obsolete legal doctrines.

That is too dismissive.

The historical doctrine arose from an enduring problem: what happens when someone who is otherwise a stranger to a dispute acquires an economic interest in its prosecution?

American law eventually concluded that an absolute prohibition went too far. Contingency fees could provide access to courts. Financing could permit meritorious claims to survive against better-capitalized opponents. Those are substantial considerations.

But abandoning a categorical prohibition did not make the underlying incentive problem disappear.

Modern litigation finance makes that especially apparent. Today a lawsuit can be evaluated, financed, diversified, modeled, and monetized as an investment. Portfolios of claims can support financing. Law-firm economics can attract institutional capital. Management structures can place sophisticated investors immediately adjacent to professional legal practices even where formal ownership restrictions remain intact.

California’s newly enacted legislation illustrates how current the issue has become. The state has not outlawed investment or financing. Instead, it has drawn an explicit line at the point where outside capital begins influencing professional judgment, case selection, settlement, litigation strategy, budgeting, or other substantive litigation decisions.

That is, in modern statutory language, essentially the same question that champerty law was attempting to answer generations ago.

Who should be permitted to acquire a financial interest in a lawsuit, and how much influence should that interest confer?

There may be good reasons to permit carefully regulated litigation finance. There may be circumstances in which outside capital materially improves access to justice. There are certainly legitimate businesses and sophisticated commercial parties capable of evaluating those tradeoffs for themselves.

But the legal profession should not pretend that the growth of litigation finance is merely another innovation in corporate finance.

Courts are public institutions. Clients possess legal rights, not securities. Lawyers exercise professional judgment under duties that do not run to investors. And an investor whose return depends upon litigation has an economic interest in how that litigation is conducted, regardless of how carefully the transaction documents describe the relationship.

Two centuries ago, the law regarded that combination of capital, litigation, and outside financial interest with considerable suspicion.

We called the problem maintenance and champerty.

Today, much of the same economic activity is described as litigation finance, portfolio funding, alternative legal investment, or private-equity participation in legal services.

The terminology has changed considerably.

The underlying incentives have not.

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