
On human nature, the email economy, the false promise of collapse, and the exhaustion of living in a civilization that cannot simplify itself
By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.
November 17, 2026
There is a disturbing possibility that deserves more attention than it receives in American political debate: modern civilization may have constructed a system that is simultaneously too large to sustain, too complicated to reform, and too indispensable to dismantle. We have become dependent upon institutions whose continuing expansion may be undermining the productivity, independence, and personal responsibility necessary to support them. Yet any serious effort to dismantle those institutions could produce economic and social disruption on a scale that modern society is no longer equipped to withstand.
Conservatives promise smaller government, fewer regulations, lower taxes, and a restoration of market discipline. Progressives promise more effective administration, a stronger social safety net, and public institutions capable of protecting citizens from the insecurities of the marketplace. Both sides generally assume that an acceptable balance exists and that the right combination of policies, leaders, and reforms will eventually discover it. The disagreement is over the formula, not over the existence of a solution.
I am increasingly skeptical of that premise. Perhaps the difficulty lies deeper than a collection of bad policies or incompetent officials. Perhaps prosperity weakens some of the qualities that originally made prosperity possible. Perhaps specialization makes civilization richer while making individuals less capable of surviving without civilization. Perhaps government expands because citizens demand protection from risks they once had to bear themselves, while the resulting bureaucracy gradually becomes an economic constituency that cannot be removed without creating new hardship.
And perhaps the most unsettling fact is not that civilization is about to collapse. It is that the collapse never arrives. We do not wake up to a revolutionary reset that clears away decades of accumulated dysfunction. We wake up, pay the bills, argue with an insurance company, respond to emails, buy increasingly expensive necessities, and do the same thing again tomorrow. The system remains functional enough to require our participation and dysfunctional enough to exhaust us.
That may be the real dystopia. Not the cinematic destruction of civilization, but its interminable administration.
The Civilization That Has Forgotten How to Survive
Modern Americans enjoy conveniences that would have appeared miraculous to almost every prior generation. We purchase food without producing it, drink water without treating it, operate vehicles we cannot manufacture, and live in homes heated, cooled, and illuminated by systems that few of us understand. Medicine, communications, refrigeration, transportation, banking, and the ordinary movement of goods depend upon a vast network of specialized people, equipment, rules, and institutions. The more successfully the network operates, the less we notice it.
Yet how many of us could perform even a small portion of the tasks necessary to survive independently? Most Americans could not slaughter and prepare a chicken, hunt and dress a deer, grow enough food to feed a household, generate reliable electricity, repair a municipal water system, or manufacture the medicines they use. I include myself. I have practiced law for more than twenty-seven years, including trying civil cases and representing businesses in complex disputes. That experience may be valuable in an organized legal economy, but it does not mean I could feed my family if the economic infrastructure supporting that economy suddenly disappeared.
There is nothing intrinsically shameful about this dependence. Adam Smith understood the extraordinary productive power of specialization. We are wealthier precisely because the surgeon does not spend the morning raising wheat, the farmer does not spend the afternoon designing transformers, and the electrician does not need to know how to manufacture a refrigerator. The division of labor allows individuals to develop expertise and exchange its fruits. A community of specialists can produce far more than a collection of self-sufficient families performing every task badly.
But collective productivity and individual resilience are different achievements. A system can be exceptionally productive under ordinary conditions and exceptionally vulnerable when its connections fail. The surgeon needs functioning hospitals, clean instruments, electricity, drugs, transportation, and a population capable of paying for treatment. The farmer needs machinery, fertilizer, fuel, financing, roads, and customers. The lawyer needs courts, enforceable judgments, property records, banks, and clients who possess enough resources to pay for legal representation. The supposedly independent professional is frequently dependent upon more invisible relationships than the person who works with his hands.
Our ancestors often lacked the extraordinary productive capabilities of modern technology, but they generally understood more about the immediate physical necessities of their own existence. A household could not necessarily manufacture everything it consumed, but the connection between labor and survival was more visible. In modern society, that connection has been obscured by layers of technical expertise and commercial exchange. We have achieved abundance partly by distributing essential knowledge so widely that no individual can possess more than a fraction of it.
The danger is not specialization itself. Without specialization, modern medicine, transportation, and agriculture would be impossible. The danger is forgetting the conditions that make specialization viable: trust, functioning institutions, reliable exchange, physical infrastructure, and enough people capable of performing work that produces and maintains real things. A civilization can become so proficient at managing its own arrangements that it loses sight of the activities those arrangements were created to support.
The Difference Between Intelligence, Expertise, and Actual Competence
A modern society can contain millions of educated people and still be dangerously ignorant about its own survival. Education is not the same as competence in every domain, and a credential is not proof that the holder can produce something necessary outside the institutional setting in which the credential has value. A person may be brilliant at finance, medicine, programming, or law while being nearly helpless without electricity, functioning transportation, and a reliable supply of food.
The mistake is to assume that because an occupation does not produce a tangible object, it has no economic value. That is obviously false. A sound legal opinion can prevent a costly dispute. Competent accounting can keep a business solvent. Software can coordinate millions of transactions. A physician’s diagnosis can save a life. Intellectual labor is real labor, and its contribution cannot be measured by whether it leaves dirt beneath someone’s fingernails.
The more useful distinction is between work that solves an underlying problem and work that exists primarily because the institutional arrangements surrounding the problem have become excessively complicated. Even this distinction is difficult to draw. A compliance officer may prevent serious environmental damage or may spend a career reconciling forms whose inconsistencies were created by another department. A lawyer may protect a client against fraud or litigate an ambiguity that could have been eliminated by writing a simpler regulation. The same occupational title can describe indispensable work or costly circular activity.
The central question is therefore not whether society needs farmers instead of lawyers, engineers instead of administrators, or physical labor instead of intellectual labor. It is whether the growing structure of administration serves productive activity or increasingly makes productive activity serve the needs of administration. An advanced society requires both intelligence and competence, but it also requires enough institutional honesty to distinguish genuine accomplishment from the appearance of accomplishment.
The Email Economy and the Manufacture of Administrative Work
I have come to think of a large part of modern institutional life as the email economy. I do not claim to have invented the expression, and similar descriptions of bureaucratic work have been around for years. I use it to describe the expanding network of people whose principal occupation is to send, receive, interpret, circulate, document, and respond to communications generated by other administrative processes.
Consider an ordinary commercial project. A business owner proposes to build, manufacture, transport, develop, or sell something. A regulator requires an application. A consultant prepares it. Another professional determines whether the application satisfies a different regulation. An administrator asks for additional materials. An attorney interprets the request. A manager organizes a conference. Someone prepares minutes. The participants exchange emails clarifying what the minutes mean. A revised submission produces another round of comments. A dispute requires a hearing, and the hearing requires notices, disclosures, scheduling instructions, and a written ruling. An appeal may follow. The appeal produces another layer of documents and another professional constituency.
Some of this may be entirely justified. A project may threaten water supplies, neighboring property, public safety, or the rights of people who did not consent to its risks. The existence of legitimate interests, however, does not establish that every procedure imposed in their name is necessary or proportionate. Procedures can grow well beyond the problem they were designed to address, and the cost of participating in them can become a barrier to otherwise lawful activity.
Every individual in this chain may be working diligently. The administrator follows the rules. The consultant produces the required report. The lawyer protects the client’s interests. The government employee receives a salary and supports a family. The private employee does the same. None of that answers the larger question: would society be better off if some of the requirements generating the work did not exist in the first place?
There is an important difference between an occupation being necessary under present conditions and the conditions themselves being necessary. A business may genuinely need three lawyers and two consultants to navigate a licensing process, but that does not prove that the licensing process should require three lawyers and two consultants. The work is indispensable because the system has made it indispensable. That is a peculiar form of economic dependence.
The process also becomes self-reinforcing. A new rule creates a compliance task. The task creates a department. The department develops expertise in the rule and acquires an interest in preserving it. The rule generates disputes that produce interpretations, exceptions, additional guidance, and further rules. Entire professional careers become organized around solving difficulties produced by earlier institutional decisions. Eliminating a requirement may threaten the employment of people who never had any responsibility for creating it.
The email economy is not composed entirely of lazy or incompetent people. It is a system in which conscientious people can spend enormous energy maintaining complexity whose total value no single participant has the authority or incentive to question. Modern institutions can be full of activity while remaining uncertain about what the activity accomplishes.
How Administration Becomes Its Own Product
Complexity does not always grow because a committee consciously decides to make life difficult. It often grows through a succession of individually defensible choices. An accident prompts a new safety requirement. A scandal produces additional disclosure obligations. An unfair decision leads to an appeal procedure. A poorly designed form generates instructions intended to correct misunderstandings. A disputed instruction creates a clarification. Nobody necessarily intends to create a labyrinth, but the labyrinth emerges because the additions are cumulative and the removals are politically difficult.
There is an asymmetry at work. When an institution fails to prevent a visible harm, the demand for a new safeguard can be immediate and intense. When an institution imposes a thousand small costs on a thousand different people, no single incident may attract comparable attention. The costs are real, but they are dispersed, delayed, and often invisible. The benefits of a new rule can be described in a press release; the productive activity discouraged by the rule may never take place and therefore never become a headline.
An institution also has trouble admitting that a substantial portion of its own work is unnecessary. The admission would call into question its budget, staffing, expertise, and perhaps the careers of the officials responsible for its decisions. A private company facing competition may be forced to confront an inefficient process because customers can leave. A government office may face far weaker feedback. Its customers are often required by law to continue dealing with it, whether or not the service improves.
This is not proof that private businesses are always efficient. Large corporations develop their own bureaucratic rituals, pointless meetings, elaborate approval chains, and internal politics. A manager can spend all day monitoring other managers while the employees who actually produce the company’s goods struggle to obtain a necessary decision. Government and corporate bureaucracies often reinforce one another; the regulations generate private compliance departments, and the departments become permanent intermediaries between businesses and regulators.
The result is a kind of institutional flywheel. Each additional layer makes the existing structure harder to understand. The difficulty creates demand for specialized interpreters. Their expertise makes the system navigable for those who can afford it while making simplification less attractive to the people whose livelihoods depend upon that expertise. No conspiracy is required. Ordinary incentives do the work.
Economic Activity Is Not the Same as Economic Value
Politicians routinely celebrate the creation or preservation of jobs. Employment matters because people need income, families need stability, and communities cannot function if large numbers of residents are suddenly deprived of their livelihoods. But the existence of a paying job is not, by itself, proof that the activity performed creates net value.
Imagine that a city establishes a complicated requirement governing the use of commercial property. It hires administrators to enforce the requirement. Property owners hire consultants and lawyers to comply. The administrators and professionals are paid. Their employees buy groceries, rent homes, and support other businesses. The regulation has unquestionably generated economic transactions and employment. It remains possible that the total cost of those transactions exceeds any benefit produced by the regulation.
The relevant economic question is not how much money passes through the resulting system. It is what else the labor, capital, and time could have produced. The business owner might have invested in equipment, expanded operations, reduced prices, or hired workers who provide goods and services to customers. The administrator might have become an engineer, teacher, entrepreneur, or skilled technician. Those possibilities are difficult to count precisely because they never happened.
There is, however, a danger in turning this observation into a crude division between supposedly productive citizens and everyone else. A service can produce tremendous value without producing a physical object. Preventing contamination, negotiating a sound contract, operating a reliable payment system, or helping someone recover from illness may be more useful than manufacturing an unnecessary commodity. The problem is not that economic value must be tangible. The problem is that compensation and bureaucratic activity are imperfect measures of it.
The tragedy is that once people have organized their lives around jobs created by a questionable system, dismantling the system can impose genuine hardship. A position may be economically unnecessary in the long run and nevertheless be essential to a particular family’s mortgage payment next month. The distinction between what society should have built and what society can now safely remove becomes increasingly painful.
A Trial Lawyer’s Confession: My Profession Is Part of the Problem
I cannot discuss this phenomenon honestly without acknowledging my own profession. I have spent more than twenty-seven years practicing law, representing clients in commercial disputes, property matters, and litigation involving government regulation. Some of the legal work I have performed has been made necessary by the very statutory and administrative complexity that I criticize. My livelihood depends partly upon the continued existence of a system whose unnecessary expansion I regard as a threat to freedom and economic independence.
Early in my career, I worked on environmental regulatory matters involving phosphate mining. I remember questioning why a business seeking to extract minerals from its own property should face enormous permitting expenses and prolonged administrative proceedings, particularly when the responsible environmental agency supported its position. Third parties who did not own the property could nevertheless initiate challenges that added time and expense to the project.
I do not suggest that property ownership gives a mining company an unlimited right to harm its neighbors or contaminate public resources. Water moves across property boundaries, and the consequences of industrial activity are not always confined to the land on which that activity takes place. Legitimate environmental protection is therefore not inherently incompatible with private property rights. What troubled me was the possibility that the process itself could become disproportionate to the interests it supposedly protected, while the ability to impose expense and delay became a form of leverage in its own right.
That is enough of the phosphate example. The more important point is the one it raises about my profession. A complicated regulatory system creates demand for lawyers. The business needs counsel to obtain approvals. The objectors need counsel to challenge them. The government needs lawyers to defend its decisions. The resulting appeals generate additional work for still more lawyers. Each lawyer may be performing entirely legitimate professional services. Yet the multiplication of legal fees does not demonstrate that the underlying public problem has become any better understood or more effectively resolved.
The same concern applies beyond government regulation. Our civil justice system can generate enormous amounts of work over procedural disputes, discovery obligations, litigation expenses, sanctions, and attorney’s fees. Some of this protects important rights. Some of it reflects the fact that the legal machinery has acquired a complexity that demands specialized assistance merely to keep it operating. Attorneys can become economically dependent upon the inefficiencies they spend their careers criticizing.
I am not standing outside this arrangement in moral judgment. I am part of it. I make my living practicing law under the rules that exist, not under the rules I might design if I could begin civilization again. I believe in the importance of effective legal representation, and I have seen how much harm incompetent representation can cause. But I cannot honestly claim that every dollar spent navigating the legal system represents a dollar that society needed to spend.
This is a conflict of incentives, not necessarily a conflict of professional ethics. A lawyer can conscientiously defend a client under existing law while believing that the law should be substantially simplified. Indeed, someone who has spent decades dealing with the system may be unusually well positioned to recognize its defects. The uncomfortable truth remains that reform could reduce demand for some of the legal services upon which lawyers, including me, depend.
The Patent Question and the Professional Interest in Complexity
My skepticism extends to the patent system. A patent is a government-created exclusive right. The system is defended as a means of rewarding invention, encouraging disclosure, and providing incentives to undertake costly research. Those are serious arguments. Developing a useful drug, medical device, or industrial process can require extraordinary investments, and competitors able to copy a successful invention immediately may undermine the incentive to make those investments.
Nevertheless, the patent system also creates a complicated structure of applications, examinations, licensing agreements, validity disputes, infringement claims, and litigation. Specialized lawyers acquire expertise in obtaining, interpreting, defending, and challenging the government-created rights. The profession is economically invested in a system whose merits should be judged by its effects on innovation and the public, not by the income it provides to the professionals who administer it.
I am not proposing that the patent system can be abolished without consequences. Trade secrets, first-mover advantages, private contracts, prizes, and other arrangements may support some forms of innovation, but it would be irresponsible to pretend they perfectly replace every function patents serve. The philosophical question is whether the existing balance of monopoly rights, competitive freedom, litigation expense, and innovation actually produces the results its defenders attribute to it.
That question is uncomfortable precisely because it implicates respectable professions and financially secure people, not merely anonymous bureaucrats. It is easy to condemn someone else’s government-created advantage. It is considerably harder to examine one’s own.
The Free Market Needs Institutions It Cannot Create by Itself
The temptation, after recognizing how extensively government interferes with productive activity, is to imagine that almost everything would work better if government simply stepped aside. Markets are remarkably effective at coordinating dispersed information and rewarding people who produce goods and services others want. Prices transmit information about scarcity and demand without requiring a central office to know what every individual needs. Competition subjects businesses to a discipline that many public institutions rarely experience.
Yet voluntary exchange cannot exist in a durable form without some means of establishing and protecting the conditions under which exchange occurs. Ownership must be ascertainable. Contracts must be enforceable. Fraud and violence must have consequences. Disputes must be resolved by institutions more reliable than whichever party possesses greater physical force. Commercial credit depends upon a reasonable expectation that promises and judgments will mean something tomorrow. Even a society determined to minimize government needs rules and some institution capable of enforcing them.
This is where the political philosophy of Alexander Hamilton becomes relevant. Hamilton did not regard the creation of a capable national government as necessarily inconsistent with commercial freedom. Reliable public credit, enforceable obligations, and governmental capacity could make private economic activity more secure. The state was not simply a predator from which productive citizens needed protection; properly limited and effectively administered, it could also be a precondition of commercial prosperity.
But that proposition contains the seed of its own contradiction. A government strong enough to enforce private rights is also strong enough to burden their exercise. An institution capable of maintaining a stable legal system can acquire the ability to regulate more areas of private life. A revenue system capable of supporting public credit can support functions far removed from the limited purposes for which citizens initially accepted taxation. The question is not whether government can serve legitimate purposes. It is whether institutions with legitimate purposes can reliably restrain themselves from acquiring additional ones.
Nor does the problem disappear by transferring governmental functions to private enterprises. A monopoly or cartel can impose its own rules on people who have no practical alternative. Private bureaucracy may be less visible than public bureaucracy, but it can be just as difficult to escape. A supposedly free market can become dominated by institutions that are formally private but exercise power over economic life resembling governmental authority. Economic liberty requires both limits on the state and conditions in which private competition is meaningful.
This is the difficulty with slogans about government and freedom. Liberty is not produced simply by subtracting government from a numerical equation. But the institutions necessary to preserve liberty can also become the instruments through which liberty is diminished.
The Healthcare Paradox: An Affluent Society That Cannot Provide Access
American healthcare is one of the clearest illustrations of administrative civilization’s contradictions. We possess extraordinary medical knowledge, sophisticated hospitals, skilled surgeons, remarkable imaging technology, and pharmaceuticals that would have been unimaginable to previous generations. The scientific capability is real. So is the capacity of the system to make treatment extraordinarily difficult for an ordinary person to obtain.
I know this from experience. I underwent back surgery that failed to resolve my chronic pain. I have continued to work and to make an effort to remain physically active. Yet I presently have no health insurance and cannot obtain the medical care I need. Having spent more than twenty-seven years practicing law does not enable me to navigate my way around the practical barrier between a patient who needs treatment and a system that can provide it. I can understand the language of statutes and contracts and still find myself unable to purchase a medical service on terms I can afford.
That experience has made the abstractions of political debate harder to tolerate. Advocates of one approach discuss the virtues of private competition. Advocates of another discuss expanding public entitlements. In the meantime, patients encounter eligibility determinations, insurance networks, coding requirements, reimbursement rules, administrative appeals, and prices that are difficult to discover or compare. The machinery involved in financing and authorizing care can become almost as elaborate as the medical treatment itself.
The underlying transaction appears simple. A patient needs care, and a physician has the ability to provide it. But medicine is not a simple consumer market. A patient facing a serious illness may have no realistic opportunity to comparison-shop, and even knowledgeable patients cannot reliably evaluate all the treatment options available to them. Catastrophic expenses exceed what most families can pay from ordinary savings. Insurance and some means of pooling risk therefore serve legitimate economic purposes. Assistance for people who cannot afford care raises legitimate questions of public responsibility.
Recognizing those facts, however, does not validate every institution built around them. A program may help some people and exclude others who are equally vulnerable. An insurer may reduce certain financial risks while introducing a separate system of restrictions and administrative costs. A government agency may employ hundreds of people to administer eligibility rules, yet a person who has worked for decades may still find that no available arrangement provides affordable access to treatment. The number of employees engaged in administering healthcare is no measure of the number of people receiving effective medical care.
The fundamental frustration is not merely that the system is expensive. It is that so much expense appears to arise from difficulties created by the system’s own structure. Doctors must spend time satisfying payment rules. Patients must spend time learning those rules. Lawyers become involved when coverage is disputed. Government agencies and private insurers develop overlapping procedures. Every attempted correction creates new terminology, exceptions, and categories. The sick person becomes an applicant, the physician becomes a billing participant, and the medical appointment becomes the endpoint of an administrative campaign.
We should also resist the easy conclusion that everyone receiving assistance is exploiting the system. Illness can strike people who have worked diligently all their lives. Disability is not reliable evidence of laziness, and physical appearance tells us little about the circumstances that brought a person to a hospital. The legitimate criticism is that we have built an expensive and inconsistent financing arrangement in which people who need help may be excluded while the institutions administering help continue to grow. That is a critique of institutional design, not a claim that human worth can be established from a person’s health or earning capacity.
My frustration is personal, but the philosophical question is broader: how can a society possess such extraordinary productive capacity and still construct rules that prevent its own members from obtaining essential services? The possibility that a problem can persist while an entire economic industry develops around managing it is central to the paradox of administrative civilization.
Human Nature Does Not Improve Merely Because Our Institutions Become More Sophisticated
No political system can be better than its understanding of the people who must operate it. Human beings are capable of courage, generosity, discipline, invention, and extraordinary sacrifice. They are also capable of laziness, envy, selfishness, dishonesty, complacency, and an almost unlimited talent for explaining why someone else should bear an unpleasant burden. These characteristics are not distributed exclusively among the rich, the poor, government workers, or private employees. They are features of human nature, and I am not exempt from them.
I know that if I were guaranteed a comfortable salary regardless of my work, I would sometimes be tempted to spend the afternoon doing something more enjoyable. Anyone who claims never to experience that temptation may possess a degree of discipline I do not recognize in myself. People can take pride in their work, and many continue working intensely even when they have no immediate financial need to do so. Nevertheless, an economic system cannot reasonably assume that everyone will always choose effort over convenience without regard to incentives or consequences.
The free market’s great strength is that it does not require a society populated entirely by saints. Businesses that repeatedly disappoint customers may lose business. Entrepreneurs who produce something useful can earn rewards. Consumers have reasons to compare alternatives. Financial losses convey information that administrators cannot reliably reproduce through written evaluations or internal performance meetings. Competition is imperfect, but it provides a form of discipline that often operates without requiring a superior authority to decide who deserves success.
Government agencies do not usually face the same feedback. A dissatisfied citizen cannot necessarily take a building permit application to a competing county. A resident who finds a licensing office unresponsive cannot simply refuse to participate in a mandatory process. Public administrators answer to supervisors, legislatures, courts, budgets, and elections, but these mechanisms are indirect and frequently slow. The person experiencing the problem has less immediate leverage than a customer who can take his money elsewhere.
The defect is not that public employees are morally inferior. Many are conscientious and capable, and many private employees are neither. The defect is that institutional arrangements influence behavior. Good incentives do not eliminate dishonesty, but bad incentives can reward it. A bureaucracy that treats processing more paperwork as evidence of success may encourage more paperwork. A department that measures its importance by the size of its budget may resist the efficiency that would justify a smaller one. A lawyer who bills by the hour may have a financial interest in a dispute lasting longer, even when professional obligations require pursuing the client’s interests rather than the lawyer’s convenience.
An honest political philosophy must ask how institutions work when the people staffing them are ordinary, flawed human beings. The assumption that the right administrators can overcome the imperfections of everyone else is especially dangerous, because those administrators possess the same imperfections as the people they govern.
Responsibility, Compassion, and the Problem of the Person Who Cannot Compete
The importance of economic incentives does not answer the moral question of what society owes people who cannot support themselves. A child produces little marketable value while requiring years of care. An elderly person may no longer work after decades of contribution. Illness and injury can deprive a capable person of the ability to earn a living. Some people will need assistance throughout their lives. These realities cannot be wished away by repeating the virtues of competition.
A society that promises unlimited support without regard to conduct or circumstance risks weakening the incentives that support its productive base. But a society that abandons everyone who becomes unproductive creates a different form of insecurity. The successful entrepreneur may become disabled tomorrow. The experienced professional may develop an illness he cannot afford to treat. The capable worker may grow old. If the right to survive depends entirely on current earning capacity, almost every citizen eventually has reason to fear the system that supposedly rewards independence.
This does not require pretending that every demand for assistance is justified. People sometimes make irresponsible choices. Benefits can be poorly designed. Programs can discourage work, reward opportunism, and remain in place after their stated purposes have disappeared. There are limits to what taxpayers can reasonably be required to provide. Those limits matter, because a society that consumes its productive capacity in the name of compassion eventually undermines its ability to help anyone.
But human dignity cannot be reduced to a current balance sheet. The distinction between protecting people from destitution and insulating everyone from the consequences of their decisions is difficult, yet unavoidable. A compassionate society needs the resources generated by productive work; a productive society needs sufficient security and social trust to keep people from regarding every setback as a threat to survival. The two goals sustain and undermine each other in ways that cannot be permanently reconciled by a slogan.
The ideal of total self-sufficiency is no more realistic than the ideal of total public provision. Individuals are vulnerable, markets are interdependent, and no family can reliably prepare for every catastrophe. The moral difficulty is deciding when assistance preserves the conditions for independence and when assistance gradually replaces independence. That is a judgment each generation must make again, under conditions that never remain fixed.
Why Government Growth Is Politically Easier Than Government Contraction
The expansion of a public program usually creates identifiable beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries may include people receiving useful services, employees administering them, contractors supplying equipment, professionals advising on compliance, and industries that have adapted to the governing rules. When a proposal arises to eliminate the program, these groups have concrete reasons to organize against the change. Their jobs, contracts, benefits, and expectations are at stake.
The people paying the program’s dispersed costs may have less reason to organize. A taxpayer who bears a small share of hundreds of programs may have neither the time nor the information necessary to evaluate them individually. The cost of understanding a complicated system may exceed the financial benefit any one person would receive from reform. Political ignorance is not necessarily a sign that voters are stupid; it can be a rational response to a system whose details are too numerous for any individual to master.
Moreover, elected officials are rewarded and punished on political schedules that rarely correspond to the long-term consequences of fiscal decisions. The benefits of a new program may become visible before the next election. The cost of debt, pension obligations, deferred maintenance, or diminished business investment may fall on people who will vote in a different decade. Politicians are therefore encouraged to make commitments whose true price will be paid by successors and citizens not present when the commitments were made.
Rules can also become valuable to the businesses that supposedly resent regulation. A large company can afford lawyers, compliance departments, and specialized consultants. A small competitor may not. What begins as a rule intended to protect the public can become an entry barrier that protects established firms from competition. Some beneficiaries of regulation are not government employees at all; they are private companies that have learned to prosper within the protected structure.
The resulting coalition is difficult to dislodge because it is not simply a coalition of people who believe in big government. It includes conservatives and progressives, corporations and public agencies, employees and contractors, professionals and program recipients. Each group may oppose government expansion in the abstract while defending the particular arrangements on which its own members depend. We can all favor reform until reform reaches our own source of income.
WALL-E Is Not Really About the Future
When I first watched Pixar’s WALL-E, I did not see a distant fantasy about human beings one day becoming helpless passengers on a spaceship. I saw an exaggerated portrait of a society already taking shape. I have made that observation ever since the film came out. The exaggeration is precisely what makes the satire effective: the humans do not literally resemble most people walking down an American street, and we have not abandoned Earth for a luxury vessel, but the underlying habits are instantly recognizable.
The people aboard the Axiom inhabit a world where every necessity and nearly every desire has been made effortless. They travel in motorized chairs, receive food and entertainment through automated systems, and live inside an environment designed to eliminate inconvenience. They are constantly connected to screens and almost entirely disconnected from their surroundings. Their material needs are met so completely that many appear to have lost the capacity to ask what their lives are for or who controls the system sustaining them.
The important detail is not their body size. A disabled person using a wheelchair may be extraordinarily independent, productive, and resourceful. A physically fit person may spend an entire life avoiding responsibility. The film’s sharper observation concerns agency. Its passengers have surrendered practical control over their circumstances. Convenience has gradually replaced competence, entertainment has displaced attention, and the machinery intended to serve humanity has become the environment within which humanity passively exists.
The story is often interpreted as a warning about environmental damage, consumerism, or corporate power. Those elements are plainly present. The Axiom’s world is associated with a vast corporation, not simply an omnipotent government. That distinction matters because modern dependence is not created by public institutions alone. Corporate platforms, insurers, financial firms, entertainment companies, and technology providers can create dependencies every bit as consequential as those produced by administrative agencies. The political distinction between public and private power does not erase the human danger of surrendering agency to either.
What makes WALL-E so unsettling is that no conventional tyrant needs to stand over the passengers with a weapon. Their submission has become comfortable. They do not rebel because the system continues to deliver what they have learned to want. Control is exercised not chiefly by terror but by habit, convenience, and the absence of imaginable alternatives. A person who never needs to make a consequential decision gradually loses the practice of making consequential decisions.
Look around at contemporary life. People communicate through devices they cannot repair, obtain directions from systems they do not understand, order necessities through platforms they do not control, and conduct financial transactions through institutions that can suspend access according to rules few customers have read. This does not mean the devices are evil or that technological progress should be reversed. It means we have traded portions of practical autonomy for efficiencies so attractive that the trade hardly registers as a choice.
The film’s most radical idea is that humanity must relearn participation in its own existence. That is not merely a call to exercise more or spend less time looking at a screen. It is a political and philosophical warning that abundance without responsibility can produce a peculiar kind of captivity. The passengers are protected from discomfort but increasingly incapable of governing themselves. Their comforts are real; their freedom is questionable. A civilization that can satisfy every request without requiring meaningful participation risks creating people who can no longer distinguish service from control.
This is why I regard WALL-E as a satire of the present, not an accurate forecast of a distant century. Its absurdities are visual. Its underlying social diagnosis is contemporary.
The Hunger Games and the Government That Lives in a Different Country From Its Citizens
Suzanne Collins’s The Hunger Games, first published as a novel in 2008 and adapted into a film in 2012, strikes me as another major work of contemporary political criticism. I would place the original story in serious conversation with dystopian classics such as Nineteen Eighty-Four and Fahrenheit 451. The precise mechanisms of oppression differ, but all three ask what happens when a political order acquires the power to organize reality for people who have little ability to resist it.
The obvious surface story concerns Katniss Everdeen, a young woman from a poor district who survives through skill, courage, and the ability to hunt with a bow. Jennifer Lawrence gives the film much of its emotional force, but the story is not fundamentally about an attractive heroine shooting arrows. It is about a political economy in which the people doing the essential work live under a ruling class that has become culturally, economically, and morally detached from them.
The districts mine, farm, manufacture, and otherwise sustain the country of Panem. The Capitol consumes the benefits, exercises political control, and turns the suffering of district children into televised entertainment. The annual competition is fictional and grotesque; modern America does not compel children to fight to the death in a televised arena. To claim otherwise would destroy the distinction between an effective allegory and a literal description of political life.
But the social distance portrayed in the film is recognizable. The inhabitants of the Capitol speak, dress, celebrate, and consume as though their existence were almost entirely separate from the labor that supports it. Their extravagance is not merely a visual joke. It signifies a class of people for whom the consequences of political decisions are remote. They can turn hardship into spectacle because they do not experience that hardship as an immediate threat to their own lives.
Effie Trinket, played by Elizabeth Banks, embodies this absurdity. Her elaborate costumes, relentlessly cheerful formalities, and devotion to ceremonial propriety are funny until one remembers what the ceremony is selecting children to endure. She speaks the language of etiquette and public celebration while administering something morally monstrous. The contradiction is the point: institutions can become so accustomed to their own procedures that participants treat procedural correctness as a substitute for moral judgment.
It is difficult to watch the Capitol’s media personalities, pageantry, and theatrical fashions without recognizing aspects of modern political and celebrity culture. I am not suggesting that television commentators or people living in major cities are literally equivalent to the rulers of Panem. The parallel is the insulation of a cultural and political class from the lives of people who produce food, energy, materials, and manufactured goods. The people who experience the consequences of a policy are not always the people who celebrate its symbolism or announce its supposed success.
The story also raises an uncomfortable question about war. In many societies, decisions concerning military intervention are made in political and institutional centers while the burdens of combat fall disproportionately on families far removed from those centers of power. That observation does not make the Hunger Games a literal account of any modern conflict, and it does not erase the legitimate reasons states sometimes use military force. It does illuminate the moral danger of a ruling class treating other people’s exposure to violence as an abstraction.
The Capitol’s greatest accomplishment is not merely coercion. It is control over public attention. The spectacle of the Games competes with the ability to ask why the Games exist. Personalities, costumes, slogans, and televised rivalries occupy the foreground while the economic and political structure sustaining the spectacle recedes. The audience is encouraged to judge the performances of individuals inside the arena rather than the legitimacy of the institution that placed them there.
That insight is broader than party politics. A country can become consumed by political personalities and televised conflict while the infrastructure, costs, debts, and administrative incentives governing daily life continue almost untouched. Citizens can spend years arguing about the actors without questioning the stage. The Hunger Games is powerful because it recognizes that spectacle can coexist with coercion and that an elite can be simultaneously ridiculous in its tastes and formidable in its institutional power.
If WALL-E portrays a public made passive by comfort, The Hunger Games portrays a public divided by the unequal distribution of comfort and suffering. In one story, nearly everyone is a passenger. In the other, some people are passengers because others have been made to bear the burden of keeping the system alive. Together they offer two different, exaggerated portraits of the same modern anxiety: people losing control over the arrangements that determine the conditions of their lives.
The Collapse That Never Comes
For roughly a decade, since the political upheavals surrounding Donald Trump’s first election, Americans have heard increasingly confident predictions that the existing order is on the verge of collapse. Some commentators imagine an economic reckoning; others foresee civil disorder, governmental breakdown, or a return to a more primitive and self-sufficient existence. In parts of the political right, preparing for collapse has become something approaching a cultural identity. People buy weapons, stockpile supplies, discuss survival strategies, and anticipate the moment when the elaborate machinery of contemporary life will finally stop functioning.
There is a profound distinction between preparing prudently for an emergency, predicting that institutions may fail, and actually wanting them to fail. Most people who own firearms or keep emergency supplies do not desire civil violence. Some ideological extremists, however, have openly embraced the notion that a destructive crisis would accelerate the end of existing institutions and permit a supposedly superior order to emerge. Their mistake is to imagine collapse as a political renovation rather than as an event whose consequences no faction can confidently control.
What interests me more is that the predicted general collapse has not arrived. Instead of a dramatic reckoning, people encounter an endless succession of ordinary frustrations. The gasoline bill is higher than they want it to be. Insurance is difficult to afford. They wait on hold with agencies and companies. Their taxes finance institutions they struggle to understand. They pay a professional to interpret a rule, only to learn that another institution applies the rule differently. They live through another election, another emergency, another administrative announcement, and another promise that this time the system will finally be fixed.
This may be the essential feature of modern institutional decay. A functioning system does not have to function well. It need only function well enough that people remain dependent upon it. The electricity stays on, most of the time. Food reaches the supermarket. Bank accounts continue operating. Courts enter orders, regulators issue permits, and employees receive paychecks. The benefits of civilization remain real, which makes the consequences of rejecting its institutions equally real. There is no clean break between the present and some imaginary world of restored simplicity.
Nor is gradual institutional deterioration easy to identify as a single event. A factory that was never built has no dramatic closing ceremony. A business owner who abandons an expansion because of regulatory expense does not produce unemployment figures showing the jobs that might have existed. A talented young person who chooses a protected administrative career over an uncertain productive enterprise may appear to be making a perfectly rational decision. The accumulation of these decisions can alter a society without producing a moment that everyone recognizes as catastrophe.
The political imagination is drawn to apocalyptic events because they promise a decisive before and after. But civilization may be able to endure an extraordinary amount of inefficiency, stagnation, resentment, and waste without ever delivering the grand confrontation that its critics expect. The result is less theatrical and potentially more demoralizing: not the destruction of ordinary life, but the progressive difficulty of conducting it.
Hard Times, Strong Men, and the Appeal of the Historical Cycle
A familiar saying, popularized in modern form by novelist G. Michael Hopf, describes history as a cycle in which hard times produce strong men, strong men produce good times, good times produce weak men, and weak men produce hard times again. The saying has circulated widely in political discussions for years, particularly among people who believe modern prosperity has encouraged dependency and complacency. Its popularity is unsurprising. It takes a complicated historical problem and reduces it to an intuitively satisfying pattern.
There is something worth considering in the idea. People who have endured scarcity may develop habits of thrift and preparation that their children never need to acquire. A generation that fought to establish stable institutions may be followed by generations that take those institutions for granted. Material comfort can lessen the immediate incentive to maintain difficult skills or accept sacrifices for long-term goals. Institutions can come to be valued for the benefits they distribute rather than for the conditions that made those benefits possible.
But an appealing aphorism is not a demonstrated law of history. Hard times sometimes produce strong institutions and disciplined citizens; they also produce famine, brutality, corruption, and political extremism. Prosperous societies can become complacent, but they can also educate their populations, finance scientific advances, and cultivate civic virtues that poorer societies cannot afford. Strength itself is ambiguous: military force, endurance, intellectual independence, institutional honesty, and the capacity for peaceful cooperation are not identical qualities.
The danger is allowing the saying to become a justification for welcoming catastrophe. If prosperity makes people complacent, it does not follow that inflicting deprivation will improve them. A violent crisis does not thoughtfully select those citizens who possess the virtues needed for reconstruction. It may kill precisely the people who maintain productive systems, preserve knowledge, care for the sick, and sustain social trust.
The saying is most valuable as a warning about the fragility of inherited prosperity, not as an argument that society requires periodic mass suffering. Its insight concerns how easily citizens can forget the disciplines and institutions upon which their comforts depend. Its false promise is that a breakdown will automatically restore those disciplines and leave civilization stronger than before.
Why Cutting Government by Ninety Percent Is Not a Reset Button
Suppose I were granted the ability to reduce government at every level—federal, state, county, and municipal—by ninety percent. I might initially find the idea attractive. I could imagine eliminating redundant departments, sweeping away unnecessary rules, and forcing enterprises and citizens to become more independent. But the practical consequences would be nothing like the political slogan.
In October 2026, the United States had roughly 23.3 million federal, state, and local government payroll jobs. A reduction of ninety percent, if applied directly to those positions, would eliminate approximately twenty-one million jobs. Those jobs include people in education, public safety, public health, and infrastructure, not merely workers whose days are spent exchanging administrative correspondence. The consequences would not stop with the lost salaries. Families would lose purchasing power. Local businesses would lose customers. Contractors would lose revenue. Housing loans might become unpayable. Tax collections would decline at the very moment public institutions would be struggling to perform their remaining obligations.
Even if a significant portion of the eliminated work were genuinely unnecessary, the people performing it could not instantaneously be transformed into skilled electricians, farmers, entrepreneurs, nurses, or machinists. Productive alternatives require training, capital, equipment, commercial relationships, and time. A person who has spent twenty years administering a government program may possess intelligence and discipline, yet still lack the resources and practical skills needed to begin a viable business next week. Displaced private-sector workers face the same difficulty.
The more serious problem is that government does not exist as an isolated industry. Property records, courts, roads, law enforcement, water systems, and the enforcement of contracts are woven into private economic activity. If these functions were disrupted, private enterprises would not simply be liberated from interference. They would lose some of the institutional conditions that allow customers, employees, suppliers, and lenders to cooperate. The market cannot immediately replace every public function because many private transactions depend on the existence of those functions.
A proposal to eliminate ninety percent of government is therefore not equivalent to eliminating ninety percent of unnecessary paperwork. Unless one identifies the exact functions to be removed, the obligations to be honored, and the arrangements that would replace essential services, the percentage describes an aspiration rather than a workable program. Nor can one honestly guarantee that a transition of such magnitude would be orderly. The existing system contains more dependencies than its critics usually recognize, and some of those dependencies have developed over generations.
There is a further irony: a government capable of imposing an immediate ninety-percent reduction might have to exercise extraordinary centralized power to do so. The attempt to create a freer society could require coercive authority on a scale that contradicts the society’s stated destination. Destruction is administratively simpler than reconstruction, but reconstruction is what would determine whether the people left behind were freer or merely poorer and less secure.
Promises, Pensions, and the Rule of Law
Consider the obligations government has already undertaken. Public employees have worked under compensation arrangements that may include promised retirement benefits. My own father worked as a government accountant and receives a pension. The question of whether every government position was economically necessary is separate from whether promises made in exchange for years of labor should be honored. A society cannot defend the sanctity of private contracts while casually repudiating obligations merely because the counterparty was a government employee.
The problem extends beyond pensions. Governments have borrowed money, undertaken infrastructure projects, established benefit systems, and created legal rights upon which millions of people have organized their affairs. Some commitments may be excessive or politically unwise. But abandoning them overnight could undermine the credibility of the very legal institutions that market advocates claim to value. Public finance is not an abstraction when creditors, retirees, businesses, and households have relied upon it.
Yet honoring every promise without regard to available resources may itself become impossible. Future taxpayers did not necessarily agree with the politicians who created the obligations. Some commitments were made on assumptions about population growth, investment returns, revenues, or economic conditions that may not materialize. The public can find itself divided between protecting legitimate reliance interests and imposing costs on people who never consented to the original bargain.
This is another reason there is no clean reset. Contractual fidelity and fiscal sustainability are both serious principles, and they can come into direct conflict. A civilization that relies upon enforceable obligations cannot be indifferent to either side of that conflict.
Catastrophe Does Not Sort the Useful From the Useless
There is a particularly dangerous fantasy that social collapse would somehow strip away unproductive occupations and leave behind a smaller population of resilient, practical people. The premise assumes that survival during disorder is a reliable test of merit. It is not. Disaster does not arrive as a carefully designed examination in which the competent pass and the incompetent fail.
The farmer who can grow food may depend upon a mechanic for equipment, a truck driver for supplies, and a pharmacist for essential medicine. The electrician may know how to repair wiring but not how to manufacture the components of an electrical grid. A brilliant physician may be unable to practice without sterile supplies and functioning hospitals. Young children, elderly people, and patients with serious illnesses may suffer first, regardless of anything they have contributed to society or might contribute in the future.
Modern competence is distributed across a network. A violent breakdown destroys not just administrative positions but also the conditions that allow useful knowledge to be put to work. It can replace contractual cooperation with intimidation and reduce specialized production to the immediate search for food, shelter, and security. The loss of trust may be more destructive than the loss of any single government office.
Nor does a catastrophe necessarily produce a free market. When courts cannot enforce contracts and police cannot protect property, those with the greatest capacity for violence may gain advantages over those with the greatest productive abilities. Political disorder can reward coercion rather than entrepreneurship. The private-property ideal that motivates some dreams of governmental collapse may be among the first casualties of the collapse itself.
I therefore reject the comforting idea that destruction will automatically make a civilization stronger. Recognizing that a system may be unsustainable is not a reason to romanticize the suffering of the people who depend upon it. There may be no painless solution to our institutional contradictions, but catastrophe is not a reliable cure.
Technology May Make the Email Economy Larger, Not Smaller
Artificial intelligence and automation raise another uncomfortable possibility. New technology can reduce the time required to draft correspondence, analyze data, prepare forms, and perform routine administrative tasks. One might expect that increasing the productivity of office work would finally permit institutions to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy. It may do so in some settings. But it may also allow the production of vastly more administrative work at lower cost.
An agency that can generate compliance notices automatically may issue more notices. A company that can produce lengthy reports instantly may require more reports. Lawyers may respond to machine-generated documents with machine-assisted arguments, while administrators use software to review the resulting submissions. Technology could reduce the cost of each transaction without reducing the total volume of transactions. The email economy might become an economy of automated emails, computer-generated policies, and disputes about the meaning of documents no human being had much reason to write in the first place.
The distinction between greater productivity and greater output matters. A more efficient process is valuable when it produces a necessary result with fewer resources. It is less obviously valuable when the efficiency merely encourages institutions to multiply the number of processes. Technical sophistication cannot substitute for judgment about whether a task should exist.
Meanwhile, advances in technology can deepen the difference between using a system and understanding it. A citizen may possess extraordinary informational tools while becoming more dependent upon remote platforms and infrastructure. The capacity to obtain an answer is not identical to the capacity to act independently on it. In that sense, the technological convenience celebrated by the passengers in WALL-E may become more recognizable rather than less.
The Weariness of a Civilization That Never Stops Administering Itself
One of the least discussed consequences of institutional complexity is the cumulative burden it imposes on ordinary life. A person does not need to be politically radical, economically unsuccessful, or personally defeated to find modern administration exhausting. The burden falls on business owners who spend evenings responding to regulatory requests, parents who navigate insurance and school forms, workers who manage overlapping financial obligations, and professionals who spend hours satisfying procedures unrelated to the work they entered their professions to perform.
Each demand may appear modest when examined separately. Complete another form. Update the account. Verify an identity. Obtain an authorization. Respond to an automatic message. Appeal a decision. Review the amended policy. Schedule another conference. Pay another fee. These tasks can be justified individually, and some are plainly necessary. The cumulative burden is difficult to quantify because it is divided among countless small obligations that rarely become visible as a single social cost.
That burden should not be mistaken for evidence that citizens have become incapable of hard work. Quite the opposite: many people work intensely, support their families, develop skills, and build enterprises while simultaneously managing administrative demands that consume time and attention. The complaint is not that life contains obligations. Civilization always has. The complaint is that increasingly elaborate institutions can impose obligations whose relationship to useful activity becomes difficult to discern.
People are told that the system is extraordinarily advanced, and in many respects it is. Yet a simple objective—opening a business, obtaining medical treatment, improving a property, paying a tax, or resolving a routine dispute—can require navigating procedures that no participant fully controls. The result is a distinctive political frustration: one may respect the necessity of legal order and still resent the overwhelming machinery through which that order is administered.
This is why the absence of collapse is not necessarily reassuring. An institution can maintain enough continuity to prevent catastrophe while generating enough friction to make participation steadily more burdensome. It is possible to live in a wealthy, peaceful, technologically sophisticated society and still experience an expanding distance between the promise of modern life and the practical effort required to obtain its benefits. That distance is not the same as poverty or oppression, and exaggerating it into those conditions would weaken the argument. It is nevertheless a real question about the quality of freedom within an advanced society.
There Is No Permanent Political Formula
At the foundation of these problems is an unavoidable conflict among legitimate human objectives. People want liberty, security, prosperity, predictable rules, protection against fraud, care during illness, economic opportunity, and relief from needless interference. They want institutions strong enough to protect these interests and limited enough not to threaten them. They want public assistance to exist when they need it and government costs to remain modest when they do not. They want markets to reward merit while preserving some protection against misfortune.
No political philosophy can abolish the tension among those desires. Comprehensive collectivism cannot eliminate scarcity, self-interest, or the difficulty of coordinating knowledge. An unrestricted market cannot guarantee that private power remains competitive or that every person facing illness or disability will have sufficient resources to survive. A powerful government can enforce rights and become the greatest threat to them. A weak government may interfere less while failing to protect the conditions necessary for freedom.
Aristotle understood that political society concerns the conditions of a good life, not merely the mechanics of survival. Hobbes emphasized the consequences of insecurity when political authority fails. Adam Smith explained the extraordinary productive capacity of specialization and voluntary exchange. Hamilton understood the importance of effective institutions to credit and commerce. These thinkers illuminate different dimensions of political existence; none supplies an algorithm that permanently reconciles them.
Perhaps institutions can be improved at particular times and in particular places. Some regulations can be repealed, incentives corrected, procedures simplified, and administrative redundancies eliminated. Those are meaningful achievements. But improvements are not final solutions, and reforms can create new constituencies and unintended consequences of their own. Even a society that temporarily achieves an admirable balance between freedom and security will eventually face new technologies, demographic changes, economic disruptions, and different human temptations.
My pessimism is therefore not a prediction that a particular catastrophe must occur next year or that all efforts at reform are futile. It is skepticism that civilization can ever achieve a permanent institutional settlement. Human beings will continue creating systems to solve problems, developing dependencies upon those systems, and discovering that the solutions have generated problems of their own. The cycle may change its form, but the contradiction does not disappear.
Conclusion: The Paradox We Cannot Escape
The most unsettling possibility is that administrative civilization will neither reform itself decisively nor collapse spectacularly. It may continue for generations through improvised adjustments, additional rules, technological innovations, periodic financial crises, political upheavals, and partial repairs. The people who predict a clean break may discover that there is no clean break. The people who promise comprehensive reform may discover that their reforms become another layer of the structure they intended to simplify.
I do not pretend to be exempt from the contradictions I have described. I practice a profession that depends upon law and government while questioning how much of their existing complexity is justified. I believe that private property and competitive markets are essential to prosperity while recognizing that functioning markets require courts, enforceable agreements, and institutional stability. I admire independence while knowing that modern professional life depends upon specialists whose contributions I could not reproduce. These are not reasons to abandon criticism. They are reasons to criticize honestly.
The alternatives are not a perfect free market and a perfect administrative state. They are imperfect arrangements operated by imperfect people, each possessing incentives to preserve advantages and transfer costs to others. Prosperity does not permanently cure those incentives. Education does not eliminate self-interest. Technology does not supply wisdom about which tasks are worth performing. Destruction does not reliably restore virtue. And compassion does not erase the necessity of producing the resources with which compassionate obligations are met.
We can understand why the passengers in WALL-E surrendered agency for comfort and why the citizens of Panem remained subject to an extravagant ruling class. We can recognize the temptation to dream of an abrupt reset and the equal temptation to keep adding institutions rather than risk dismantling them. We can see how work becomes necessary because of complexity and how the people who perform that work become economically dependent upon its continuation. Understanding these mechanisms, however, does not mean we possess the power to escape them altogether.
The central question remains: how do we build a civilization in which people are sufficiently free and economically independent that they no longer need government to do so much for them, while retaining a government strong enough to protect the civilization that makes their freedom possible?
I do not know that there is a permanent answer. I am increasingly doubtful that there is one. What troubles me is not simply the possibility that our institutions may someday fail. It is the possibility that they can continue functioning, expanding, and demanding our dependence long after we have lost confidence in their purposes, and that we may have no orderly way to recover the independence we have surrendered.
The darkest dystopia may not be a world in ruins. It may be a world that continues working just well enough to prevent anyone from starting over, while requiring more and more effort merely to keep living within it.
