
By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.
September 23, 2026
Environmental contamination litigation is sometimes imagined as a specialized world occupied almost exclusively by the Environmental Protection Agency, multinational industrial companies, and large law firms litigating enormous Superfund sites involving dozens or hundreds of potentially responsible parties. Those cases certainly exist, and they have generated much of the decisional law construing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, commonly known as CERCLA or Superfund.
But that image is incomplete.
CERCLA also operates in a much more familiar commercial setting. A property owner purchases or redevelops land. Environmental investigation reveals volatile organic compounds, metals, solvents, petroleum constituents, or other contaminants in soil or groundwater. Historical records disclose industrial activity, underground storage tanks, waste handling, or releases on an adjoining parcel. The owner spends money investigating the contamination or modifying construction to address vapor intrusion or other environmental risks. The resulting question is no longer merely regulatory: who must ultimately pay?
The Fourth Circuit’s recent published decision in Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC, No. 25-1919 (4th Cir. July 30, 2026), provides an unusually useful illustration of that form of private environmental litigation. Harris arose from neighboring commercial properties in Greensboro, North Carolina. One had long been operated as a gasoline station and convenience store. The adjoining owner discovered contamination during environmental investigation and installed a vapor-intrusion mitigation system in connection with redevelopment. Litigation followed under CERCLA and state law. The central federal issue became whether historical releases fell within CERCLA’s statutory exclusion for petroleum or instead involved contaminated petroleum containing hazardous substances outside the exclusion. The Fourth Circuit vacated summary judgment for the defendants and remanded for further proceedings.
The significance of Harris, however, is easier to appreciate when the case is placed within CERCLA’s broader private-liability architecture. The decision implicates questions that recur throughout contaminated-property litigation: Who qualifies as a potentially responsible party? Must the plaintiff prove that a particular defendant caused the contamination? When does petroleum cease to be merely petroleum for CERCLA purposes? What cleanup expenses are recoverable? When must a claimant proceed through contribution rather than cost recovery? How can a purchaser acquire contaminated land without assuming owner liability? And how do federal claims interact with state pollution statutes, nuisance, trespass, contract, and other private remedies?
Those questions define a substantial body of environmental law that exists apart from government enforcement proceedings.
CERCLA Is a Liability Statute as Well as a Cleanup Statute
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to address releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances and to place cleanup costs upon those legally responsible for contaminated facilities. The statute was substantially amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Its structure combines governmental response authority with a private system for recovering and reallocating environmental response costs.
The liability provision is § 107(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). It identifies four principal categories of potentially responsible parties, commonly called PRPs: the present owner or operator of a facility; a person who owned or operated the facility at the time hazardous substances were disposed of there; a person who arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances; and certain persons who accepted hazardous substances for transportation to disposal or treatment sites that they selected.
The breadth of those categories explains why environmental liability does not necessarily follow traditional notions of fault. A present owner may encounter contamination created decades before acquisition. A corporate successor may become embroiled in disputes concerning the activities of predecessor entities. A company that never owned contaminated land may face arranger liability because of its role in disposing of hazardous substances. A former owner may remain potentially responsible because disposal occurred during its ownership.
CERCLA liability is generally described as strict liability. Negligence is not an element of the § 107(a) cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit has long recognized CERCLA’s purpose of placing responsibility for hazardous-waste cleanup upon those responsible for environmental problems. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501–02 (11th Cir. 1996).
Strict liability, however, should not be confused with limitless liability. CERCLA contains defined liability categories, statutory defenses and exemptions, limitations upon particular types of substances and activities, requirements concerning recoverable response costs, and doctrines governing divisibility and contribution. Much of CERCLA litigation concerns those boundaries rather than the abstract proposition that the statute is strict-liability legislation.
The Prima Facie Private Cost-Recovery Case
A private party proceeding under § 107(a) generally must establish that the property or location at issue constitutes a CERCLA “facility”; that there has been a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance; that the defendant belongs to one of § 107(a)’s categories of responsible persons; and that the release or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur necessary response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
The Fourth Circuit summarized substantially that formulation in PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013), and again in Harris. The Eleventh Circuit has articulated the same basic framework. See Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1496–97.
“Facility” is intentionally broad under CERCLA. It encompasses not merely industrial plants or designated Superfund properties, but buildings, structures, installations, equipment, pipelines, wells, pits, ponds, landfills, storage containers, motor vehicles, aircraft, and areas where hazardous substances have been deposited, stored, disposed of, placed, or otherwise come to be located. Consequently, the fact that a property has never appeared on the National Priorities List does not place it outside CERCLA.
Nor does a private § 107 action require the EPA to have first sued anyone. This distinction became particularly important in the Supreme Court’s development of the relationship between § 107 cost recovery and § 113 contribution.
Section 107 Cost Recovery and Section 113 Contribution
One of the most important structural questions in CERCLA litigation is determining which statutory remedy the claimant possesses.
Section 107(a)(4)(B) permits a person to recover qualifying response costs that the person itself has incurred. Section 113(f), by contrast, provides rights of contribution in circumstances specified by Congress. Although both mechanisms ultimately concern environmental response costs, they are not interchangeable.
The Supreme Court began clarifying this distinction in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004). The Court held that § 113(f)(1), which authorizes contribution “during or following” a civil action under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107(a), does not give a private party an unrestricted contribution action when that triggering condition has not occurred. Id. at 166–68.
Three years later, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007), confirmed that § 107(a)(4)(B) itself provides a private cause of action to recover qualifying response costs. The Court rejected the contention that a potentially responsible party necessarily lacks a § 107 remedy merely because it may itself bear some responsibility for contamination. A party that incurs cleanup expenses directly can, in the appropriate procedural posture, recover those costs under § 107. The Court emphasized that §§ 107 and 113 create distinct though complementary remedies. Id. at 138–39.
The distinction matters enormously. Contribution under § 113 entails equitable allocation among liable parties. Different statutes of limitation may apply. Settlements can create contribution rights and contribution protection. A claimant therefore cannot simply select whichever section provides the more advantageous procedural consequences.
The Eleventh Circuit applied this principle in Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012). Solutia and Pharmacia were subject to a CERCLA consent decree requiring cleanup. They attempted to pursue § 107 cost-recovery claims for costs encompassed by obligations that gave rise to contribution rights. The Eleventh Circuit held that a party possessing a § 113 contribution claim for particular costs could not avoid the limitations accompanying that remedy by repackaging those same costs as a § 107 claim. Id. at 1236–37.
The Supreme Court added another important limitation in Territory of Guam v. United States, 593 U.S. 310 (2021). Guam had entered into a Clean Water Act consent decree concerning the Ordot Dump and later sought CERCLA contribution from the United States. The Court unanimously held that § 113(f)(3)(B) contribution requires resolution of CERCLA-specific liability. Settlement of liability under another environmental statute does not itself trigger § 113(f)(3)(B). Id. at 317–20.
Thus, before filing a private contamination action, counsel must determine not merely whether money has been spent, but why it was spent, whether there has been a CERCLA suit or settlement, what liability has previously been resolved, and which statutory mechanism governs those particular costs.
Who Is an “Owner” or “Operator”?
The simplicity of the phrase “owner or operator” conceals decades of litigation.
Current ownership can itself create potential liability under § 107(a)(1), subject to statutory defenses and liability protections. Former ownership can create liability under § 107(a)(2) if hazardous-substance disposal occurred while the defendant owned or operated the facility.
Corporate structures create additional questions. In United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that CERCLA automatically makes a parent corporation liable simply because a subsidiary owns or operates a contaminated facility. Ordinary principles protecting the separate corporate identity remain relevant. A parent may nevertheless incur direct operator liability when the parent itself manages, directs, or conducts operations specifically related to pollution or environmental compliance at the facility. Id. at 66–67.
The distinction is important in private litigation because contaminated property frequently has passed through multiple corporate entities over many decades. Determining which entity operated the relevant facility, which corporate entity survived a merger or acquisition, what liabilities were assumed contractually, and whether a parent actually exercised facility-level environmental control can become central factual issues.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Redwing Carriers decision similarly illustrates the fact-intensive nature of operator liability. There, the court examined whether various entities and individuals associated with an apartment development built on a contaminated former trucking terminal had actually participated in management or activities sufficient to fall within CERCLA’s liability categories. 94 F.3d at 1504–12.
Arranger Liability and the Limits of CERCLA’s Reach
CERCLA also extends beyond property owners. Section 107(a)(3) reaches persons who “arranged for disposal or treatment” of hazardous substances. But the statute does not make every seller of a hazardous product an arranger.
The Supreme Court addressed the distinction in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009). Shell sold a useful chemical product to a distributor and knew that accidental spills occurred during transfer and handling. The Court held that knowledge of incidental spills was insufficient. Arranger liability generally requires intentional steps directed toward disposal of a hazardous substance. Id. at 610–12.
The dividing line between sale of a useful product and arrangement for disposal can therefore be critical. Transactions involving waste oil, solvents, scrap materials, industrial byproducts, spent chemicals, recyclable materials, or off-specification products may require careful examination of what the parties were actually trying to accomplish. The label attached to a transaction is less important than its substance.
Burlington Northern also clarified another fundamental principle: even where CERCLA liability exists, joint and several liability is not automatic in every case. Where the environmental harm is divisible and the defendant establishes a reasonable basis for apportionment, liability may be apportioned. The Court upheld an apportionment based upon evidence concerning geographic area, duration of ownership, and the relative contribution of particular chemicals. Id. at 614–19.
Apportionment is conceptually different from contribution. Apportionment asks whether the underlying harm itself can reasonably be divided so that a defendant is liable only for an identifiable portion. Contribution assumes liability and permits equitable redistribution of response costs among responsible parties. In major contamination cases, that distinction can mean the difference between defending against joint and several liability and arguing later over equitable shares.
The Petroleum Exclusion: A Major Boundary of CERCLA Liability
Against that broader background, Harris Investment Holdings addresses one of CERCLA’s most important substantive exclusions.
CERCLA defines “hazardous substance” broadly, but § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), excludes “petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof” subject to the language of the statutory provision. This is generally known as the petroleum exclusion.
The exclusion creates a recurring problem because petroleum products naturally contain substances that, when encountered independently, qualify as CERCLA hazardous substances. Gasoline, for example, can contain benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene. A literal theory that the presence of any separately listed hazardous constituent eliminates the petroleum exclusion would therefore swallow the exclusion itself.
The Ninth Circuit confronted that problem in Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989). The court held that the exclusion encompasses refined gasoline notwithstanding the presence of indigenous hazardous constituents and certain additives associated with refining. Otherwise, ordinary petroleum releases would effectively become CERCLA releases whenever the petroleum contained constituents separately appearing on hazardous-substance lists. Id. at 810.
But the exclusion does not protect every substance that happens to contain petroleum.
In Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit considered crude-oil tank-bottom waste containing hazardous components. It rejected the argument that all tank-bottom material necessarily remains “petroleum” merely because petroleum is part of it. The character and source of the hazardous constituents matter.
The Eighth Circuit similarly held in United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994), that wastes containing oil mixed with substances such as PCBs and sulfuric acid did not fall within the exclusion merely because oil was among the materials involved. Hazardous substances added to petroleum, or whose concentrations increase as a result of contamination during use, can fall outside the petroleum exclusion. Id. at 1199.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Tosco Corp. v. Koch Industries, Inc., 216 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2000), likewise recognized the distinction between petroleum itself and petroleum that has become contaminated with hazardous substances. Harris relied heavily upon this accumulated body of authority in addressing the issue for the first time in the Fourth Circuit.
Harris Investment Holdings: From Gasoline Station to Federal CERCLA Litigation
The facts of Harris demonstrate why the distinction is not merely academic.
Harris Investment Holdings purchased property at 617 North English Street in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 2021. The adjoining property at 2209 East Bessemer Avenue was owned by BFJ of USA, LLC and operated as a gas station and convenience store. The BFJ property had been used for fuel-related activities for decades and had a history involving multiple underground storage tanks.
Historical tanks installed in the late 1950s included tanks used for kerosene, waste oil, and heating oil. Those tanks were closed in place in 1996. Other gasoline and diesel tanks were installed later and removed in 2007. After BFJ acquired the property in 2008, additional underground storage tanks were installed. Environmental records documented historical petroleum releases and contamination associated with the property.
Harris’s own property also had an industrial history. It had been used for automotive repair, and part had been used as a junkyard. Harris planned redevelopment and retained an environmental consultant. A Phase II environmental assessment detected volatile organic compounds and other hazardous substances in groundwater at concentrations that raised vapor-intrusion concerns. Harris consequently installed a vapor-intrusion mitigation system in connection with construction and later sought to recover associated costs from BFJ and its members.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Critically, however, it concluded that Harris had made the necessary prima facie showing under CERCLA. The dispute therefore shifted to BFJ’s petroleum-exclusion defense and to causation under Harris’s state-law claims.
Petroleum Is Not Necessarily “Only Petroleum”
On appeal, Harris first advanced a broad statutory interpretation under which the presence of individually listed hazardous substances such as benzene would take the release outside the petroleum exclusion.
The Fourth Circuit rejected that theory.
Following Wilshire Westwood and related decisions, the court held that hazardous substances indigenous to petroleum do not automatically transform an ordinary petroleum release into a CERCLA hazardous-substance release. The court reasoned that an interpretation eliminating the exclusion whenever gasoline contains naturally occurring hazardous constituents would leave the statutory petroleum exclusion with little practical significance. Harris, slip op. at 16–20.
The more difficult question was whether the historical material released from BFJ’s property was limited to unadulterated petroleum.
The record contained evidence of a waste-oil tank installed in the late 1950s and used until it was closed in 1996. The tank lacked leak detection, and oil and grease had been discovered in the soil beneath it during closure. That evidence mattered because used oil can acquire metals, combustion products, additives, acids, antifreeze, and other contaminants through use or storage. Some of those materials may themselves be CERCLA hazardous substances and may not remain within the petroleum exclusion.
The Fourth Circuit consequently rejected the proposition that evidence of a “petroleum release” necessarily established the petroleum exclusion. The relevant inquiry was not merely whether petroleum was released, but whether the petroleum that was released had been contaminated by hazardous substances outside the scope of the exclusion.
That distinction is potentially important far beyond gasoline stations. Waste-oil tanks, industrial lubricants, used hydraulic fluids, mixed wastes, tank-bottom residues, and other petroleum-containing materials may present materially different CERCLA questions from a straightforward gasoline spill.
Who Bears the Burden on the Petroleum Exclusion?
Harris is particularly important for its treatment of the evidentiary burden.
BFJ argued, in substance, that establishing historical petroleum releases shifted the burden to Harris to prove that a non-petroleum hazardous substance had been part of the released material. The Fourth Circuit questioned that formulation and stated that a defendant invoking the petroleum exclusion bears the burden of proving that the released petroleum was not contaminated with non-petroleum hazardous substances. Harris, slip op. at 22–24.
The Tenth Circuit had previously stated in Tosco that the party asserting the petroleum exclusion bears the burden on that issue. Harris brought that reasoning into the Fourth Circuit’s law and applied it directly at summary judgment.
The practical implications can be substantial in historical-contamination litigation. Environmental releases may have occurred thirty, forty, or sixty years earlier. Tanks may have been removed. Former operators may no longer exist. Environmental consultants conducting historical work may have tested only for contaminants regulated under programs important at that time. Records may describe “petroleum contamination” without attempting to identify every constituent present.
Where the defendant bears the burden of proving that a petroleum release remained within the exclusion, gaps in that historical record may matter.
Harris nevertheless did not announce liability. The court held only that BFJ had not established entitlement to summary judgment and that evidence concerning the waste-oil tank created at least a genuine factual dispute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Characterizing the decision as holding BFJ liable would therefore be incorrect.
Causation Under CERCLA Is Not Ordinary Tort Causation
Another important feature of private CERCLA litigation is the unusual role of causation.
Traditional tort claims ordinarily require the plaintiff to prove a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury. CERCLA often functions differently. The exact formulation varies somewhat among circuits and factual settings, but the statute does not generally require a private plaintiff to trace particular molecules from one defendant directly to particular response costs in the manner conventional toxic-tort causation might suggest.
In Fourth Circuit law, Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 66 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 1995), placed a substantial causation burden upon the defendant after the plaintiff establishes the statutory predicate. Harris reiterated the Fourth Circuit’s approach.
That does not mean source evidence is irrelevant. Far from it. Hydrogeology, contaminant fingerprinting, groundwater gradients, historical operations, concentration patterns, sampling locations, and temporal evidence may be essential both to establish the statutory case and to defeat defenses, establish divisibility, obtain contribution, or prove parallel state claims.
But federal CERCLA liability and common-law causation are not synonymous.
That distinction became particularly visible in Harris because the plaintiff also asserted North Carolina negligence, nuisance, trespass, and statutory claims. Those claims required a more conventional showing that contamination from BFJ’s property caused the conditions on Harris’s property. Harris’s expert ultimately opined that evidence strongly pointed away from Harris’s property as the source and that transverse groundwater flow likely resulted in migration of gasoline constituents from BFJ’s property. The Fourth Circuit regarded the evidence as sufficient—“if just barely”—to survive summary judgment.
The same environmental record therefore supported analytically different inquiries under federal and state law.
Experts and Environmental Data Can Decide the Case
Environmental contamination litigation is unusually dependent upon technical evidence.
A lawyer can identify the statutory elements of CERCLA, but scientists and engineers often establish the facts to which those elements apply. Hydrogeologists analyze groundwater direction and migration. Environmental engineers evaluate remediation alternatives. Chemists identify constituents and concentrations. Vapor-intrusion specialists assess subsurface gases and building risks. Historical consultants reconstruct former industrial operations. Property experts may address diminution in value or stigma.
Harris involved a particularly instructive expert-disclosure dispute.
Harris’s expert, Peter de Haven, initially focused on volatile organic compounds because the principal question underlying his assignment involved vapor intrusion and the need for the mitigation system. In opposing summary judgment, he submitted a declaration discussing chromium detected in historical environmental data. The district court excluded that evidence as an untimely new expert opinion.
The Fourth Circuit vacated that ruling and directed reconsideration. It observed that merely reporting chromium concentrations contained in underlying sampling data is not necessarily the same thing as offering a previously undisclosed expert opinion. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37 still govern disclosure and supplementation, but technically trained witnesses may both interpret evidence and convey factual environmental data upon which their opinions rest.
The litigation lesson is straightforward. Environmental cases reward exhaustive organization of the technical record. Individual sampling events, constituents, boring logs, monitoring-well data, agency correspondence, tank-closure reports, historical maps, and consultant memoranda may prove dispositive years after they were created.
Recoverable Response Costs and the National Contingency Plan
Establishing contamination and identifying a responsible party does not automatically establish a recoverable § 107 claim. A private claimant must have incurred “necessary costs of response” consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
This requirement sometimes receives less attention than liability, but it can defeat an otherwise viable claim.
The National Contingency Plan, promulgated at 40 C.F.R. Part 300, establishes procedures governing response actions. Private remedial actions need not achieve literal perfection, but regulations provide that an action evaluated as a whole must substantially comply with specified requirements and result in a CERCLA-quality cleanup.
Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 433 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2006), illustrates the consequence of failing that requirement. The private property owner sought CERCLA recovery for remediation costs but had not adequately complied with important NCP requirements involving evaluation of remedial alternatives and public participation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against the cost-recovery claim.
This requirement creates an important practical issue the moment contamination is discovered. A property owner may understandably want to solve the environmental problem immediately, particularly where a sale, financing, construction project, or tenant occupancy is threatened. But if the owner anticipates seeking CERCLA recovery from another party, the response process should be structured with potential NCP requirements in mind from the beginning. A technically successful cleanup is not necessarily synonymous with a legally recoverable CERCLA response action.
Purchasing Contaminated Property Without Automatically Assuming Liability
CERCLA’s current-owner liability creates an obvious transactional problem: if present owners are potentially responsible, why would anyone purchase contaminated property?
Congress addressed that concern through several protections, including the bona fide prospective purchaser, or BFPP, framework enacted as part of the 2002 Brownfields Amendments.
A purchaser can, under specified circumstances, knowingly acquire contaminated property without incurring ordinary owner liability, but the protection is conditional. Among other requirements, the purchaser must conduct “all appropriate inquiries” before acquisition and must satisfy continuing obligations after acquisition.
The Fourth Circuit’s PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013), demonstrates that BFPP status is not obtained permanently merely by conducting a Phase I environmental assessment before closing. The purchaser must continue taking the “reasonable steps” required by the statute after acquisition. Id. at 179–81.
The practical significance is substantial for developers and commercial buyers. Environmental due diligence is not simply a mechanism for estimating cleanup cost. It can determine the purchaser’s legal status under CERCLA. Purchase agreements, indemnities, access provisions, environmental insurance, post-closing remediation obligations, institutional controls, and cooperation with regulators should therefore be analyzed together rather than as separate transaction components.
Florida Property Owners Have an Additional Statutory Framework
For Florida property, CERCLA does not exist in isolation.
Chapter 376 of the Florida Statutes supplies state-law pollution remedies that can overlap with or supplement federal environmental claims. Section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes, currently provides a private cause of action for damages resulting from covered discharges or other conditions of pollution, subject to statutory provisions and defenses. Florida’s remedies are cumulative rather than exclusive.
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2004), is particularly important. Easton owned property affected by migration of contaminated groundwater from adjoining property and asserted common-law claims as well as a claim under § 376.313(3). The trial court found that the contamination diminished the property’s value but concluded that Easton had not proved that the defendants caused the contamination.
The Florida Supreme Court held that § 376.313(3) creates a statutory strict-liability cause of action for damages and does not simply modify preexisting common-law claims. The court expressly rejected the proposition that traditional proof that the defendant personally caused the original pollution was required in the manner contemplated by ordinary negligence law, subject of course to the statutory liability framework and defenses. Id. at 24–25.
That makes Aramark especially relevant to the kind of neighboring-property contamination dispute illustrated by Harris. A Florida property owner confronting migrating contamination may need to analyze CERCLA, Chapter 376, nuisance, trespass, negligence, contractual indemnity, insurance coverage, and potentially other statutory or common-law remedies simultaneously.
Those claims should not be assumed to have identical elements. The federal petroleum exclusion, for example, does not automatically dictate the scope of liability under Florida law. Likewise, a defect in a CERCLA cost-recovery claim does not necessarily dispose of independently viable state causes of action.
Environmental Regulatory Closure Does Not Necessarily End Private Liability
Another recurring source of confusion is the significance of regulatory closure.
A state environmental agency may determine that no further remedial action is required under a particular regulatory program. That determination can be enormously important. But it does not necessarily adjudicate every private right between neighboring property owners.
Harris demonstrates the problem. Historical releases at BFJ’s property had been investigated through state regulatory processes, and regulators had at various times determined that further action was unnecessary. Yet a later neighboring-property owner still pursued private CERCLA and state-law claims arising from alleged contamination and response costs.
The reason is structural. Regulatory agencies and private litigants may be answering different questions. An agency may decide whether further governmental remediation is required under a particular cleanup program. A private plaintiff may ask whether another legally responsible party should reimburse necessary costs already incurred, compensate for property damage, or bear the expense of additional response activity.
Accordingly, “no further action” does not necessarily mean “no further legal exposure.”
Historical Contamination Is a Document Case Before It Becomes a Science Case
The deeper practical lesson of this jurisprudence is the importance of historical reconstruction.
A contamination case involving a property used industrially for sixty years may require examination of former deeds, aerial photographs, Sanborn maps, corporate records, permits, tank registrations, closure reports, manifests, insurance policies, consultant reports, agency files, historical sampling data, engineering drawings, deposition testimony, and the corporate histories of businesses that disappeared decades earlier.
The legal issues frequently cannot be separated from that record.
Whether a defendant owned the property “at the time of disposal” depends upon chronology. Whether material was a useful petroleum product or contaminated waste depends upon how it was used. Whether a parent corporation qualifies as an operator depends upon what it actually did at the facility. Whether an arranger intended disposal depends upon the substance of the transaction. Whether a cleanup satisfies the NCP depends upon what investigation and decision-making occurred before and during remediation. Whether a purchaser qualifies as a bona fide prospective purchaser depends upon what occurred both before and after acquisition.
Environmental law therefore has an unusually archaeological character. The lawyer often reconstructs commercial conduct from records created decades before anyone anticipated litigation.
Private CERCLA Litigation Is Not Confined to Giant Superfund Sites
That brings the analysis back to Harris Investment Holdings.
The case is noteworthy precisely because it is ordinary.
It involves neighboring commercial properties, historical underground storage tanks, an environmental assessment performed in connection with redevelopment, contamination in soil and groundwater, a vapor mitigation system, expert testimony concerning contaminant migration, and an attempt by the owner who spent the money to recover those costs from another property owner.
The plaintiff did not need EPA to commence the case. The property did not need to become the subject of a new federal enforcement action. The dispute did not require hundreds of PRPs. It required a qualifying facility, a release or threatened release of hazardous substances, a legally responsible party, qualifying response costs, and satisfaction of CERCLA’s remaining statutory requirements.
At the same time, Harris demonstrates why seemingly modest contamination disputes can become legally sophisticated. Determining whether the petroleum exclusion applies required analysis of statutory text, refinery chemistry, used-oil contamination, decades-old tank records, EPA interpretations, federal appellate precedent from multiple circuits, expert disclosure rules, and competing theories of groundwater migration.
That is the characteristic paradox of private environmental litigation: the parcel may be small while the legal and scientific issues are not.
Conclusion
CERCLA remains associated in the public imagination with abandoned chemical plants and nationally designated Superfund sites. But the statute also governs a quieter category of disputes arising whenever commercial property, environmental contamination, historical operations, and private response costs intersect.
The governing law has developed through a series of decisions defining the boundaries of that liability regime. Bestfoods limits automatic parent-company liability while preserving direct operator liability. Burlington Northern defines arranger liability and confirms the role of divisibility and apportionment. Cooper Industries, Atlantic Research, Solutia, and Guam delineate the respective domains of cost recovery and contribution. Ashley II demonstrates the continuing obligations associated with purchasing contaminated property. Wilshire Westwood, Cose, Gurley, Tosco, and now Harris Investment Holdings define the line between excluded petroleum and petroleum contaminated with hazardous substances. And in Florida, Aramark establishes an important parallel state-law remedy for private pollution damages.
Taken together, these authorities establish a body of law that reaches well beyond government enforcement.
For a property owner, purchaser, developer, lender, business operator, or neighboring landowner, discovery of contamination may implicate transactional law, environmental regulation, hydrogeology, insurance, statutory liability, and civil litigation at the same time. The first question may be scientific—what is in the soil or groundwater?—but it rarely remains only scientific. The next questions are legal: Where did it come from? Who owned or operated the relevant properties when disposal occurred? Was the material petroleum or a hazardous substance outside the petroleum exclusion? What response costs have been incurred? Were those costs incurred consistently with the National Contingency Plan? Did a prior settlement create contribution rights? Does a purchaser possess a statutory liability defense? What state-law remedies exist? And who should ultimately bear the financial burden?
Harris Investment Holdings did not answer all of those questions, nor did it finally establish liability against the defendants before it. What it did was demonstrate, in a modern private-property dispute, why those questions continue to matter.
CERCLA may have been enacted in response to the great hazardous-waste crises of the twentieth century, but private environmental liability in the twenty-first century is not confined to Love Canal, enormous industrial complexes, or government-led Superfund litigation. Sometimes it begins with something much more ordinary: a commercial property owner conducts environmental testing and discovers that contamination may have crossed the property line.
