By Jeffrey T. Donner, Esq.

September 8, 2026

When litigation over damaged property continues for several years, the cost of repairing that property may increase substantially. Labor becomes more expensive. Material prices change. An estimate prepared shortly before mediation or trial may exceed an earlier estimate even when the proposed repairs remain essentially the same.

Those developments create an understandable concern for property owners. A claimant who receives payment years after a loss must purchase repairs in the market that exists when the money becomes available.

Nevertheless, the current cost of repairs and the legally recoverable amount are not necessarily the same. The governing contract and applicable law determine the measure of damages and the relevant valuation date. Prejudgment interest separately addresses the deprivation of money that should have been paid earlier.

These principles have significant consequences for trial preparation. A claimant who presents only a current repair estimate may fail to establish damages under the governing standard. Depending on the record and the reason for that failure, the result can be judgment for the opposing party, without another opportunity to present the missing evidence.

That was the outcome in Bandklayder Development, LLC v. Sabga, 406 So. 3d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). The Third District reversed a $425,936.75 construction-contract judgment because the homeowners established repair costs for later years but presented no evidence establishing damages as of the time of breach. The court also rejected their request for further proceedings to supply that proof. Bandklayder Development, LLC v. Sabga, 406 So. 3d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).

The decision demonstrates why valuation dates and prejudgment interest should be considered together from the beginning of a property-damage case.

The damages evidence in Bandklayder

The dispute arose from the purchase of a newly constructed residence in Coconut Grove. The parties’ agreements included a one-year warranty and obligations to complete punch-list work.

The transaction closed in June 2017 with construction issues unresolved. An escrow agreement required the developer to address specified items within thirty days or forfeit $10,000. When the work was not completed within that period, the homeowners received the escrowed funds.

Other disputes continued. Communications ended in March 2018, and the homeowners served a written notice demanding compliance in April 2018. They subsequently sued.

At the nonjury trial, the homeowners’ construction expert testified that the damages totaled $322,916.36 as of his January 19, 2022 report. By the May 2023 trial, he testified, increased construction costs had raised the amount to $435,936.75. He described that increase as 35%.

The trial judge accepted the updated figure and deducted the $10,000 already received, producing a judgment of $425,936.75.

The difficulty was that the relevant breach had occurred in June 2017 or, at the latest, April 2018. No witness testified to the damages as of either date, and no other evidence supplied the historical valuation.

The appellate court did not need to determine which of those earlier dates controlled. The record was insufficient under either one. Bandklayder, 406 So. 3d at 267–69.

The governing measure was established long before the lawsuit

In Grossman Holdings Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037, 1039–40 (Fla. 1982), the Florida Supreme Court adopted the framework governing damages for defective or unfinished construction.

Ordinarily, the injured party may recover the reasonable cost of completing or correcting the construction to conform to the contract, provided that doing so is possible and does not involve unreasonable economic waste. If correction would involve unreasonable economic waste, the alternative measure is the difference between the value of the promised construction and the value of the performance received.

The Court also explained that contract damages should be measured as of the date of breach and that subsequent fluctuations in value do not alter the nonbreaching party’s recovery. Grossman Holdings Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1982).

The governing inquiry therefore includes both the appropriate category of damages and the date at which those damages must be measured.

An expert may correctly identify the work necessary to remedy a construction defect yet fail to establish recoverable damages if the expert prices that work exclusively for the wrong period. Technical accuracy concerning present construction costs does not resolve the legal question of what the defendant owed when the breach occurred.

In Bandklayder, the court applied an established rule to a record that lacked the evidence necessary to satisfy it.

Why increased construction costs did not support the judgment

The expert’s testimony that costs had increased by 35% supplied an economic explanation for the larger estimate. It did not establish that the larger amount was recoverable under the governing damages rule.

Indeed, the Third District regarded the increase as demonstrating why the missing historical evidence mattered. If costs changed substantially between January 2022 and May 2023, the court could not assume that either later estimate accurately measured the loss several years earlier.

Nor could the court simply subtract an arbitrary amount and award the balance. A reduced figure still would require evidence connecting it to the appropriate valuation date.

The essential problem was the absence of a supported calculation for the legally relevant period. The court concluded that determining that amount from the evidence presented would require speculation. Bandklayder, 406 So. 3d at 269.

This distinction has practical significance whenever an estimate is updated during litigation. A change in the total may result from newly identified damage, a revised repair method, corrected quantities, or a different pricing period. Those changes should be identified and analyzed separately. A higher total does not, standing alone, establish an increased legal entitlement.

Prejudgment interest explains how historical damages account for delayed payment

The concern about historical valuation is straightforward: if the claimant should have received money several years ago, an award of that same principal amount today does not account for the intervening deprivation.

Florida’s prejudgment-interest doctrine addresses that problem.

In Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212, 214–15 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court explained that prejudgment interest is an element of compensation for pecuniary loss. Once a qualifying loss is fixed as of a definite prior date, interest compensates for the deprivation of that money during the intervening period. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).

For contractual debts, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Percefull, 653 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 1995), states the general rule that interest is allowable from the date the debt became due. An honest dispute about whether payment was owed does not necessarily defeat interest once the obligation is established. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Percefull, 653 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1995).

These principles separate two components of compensation. The principal represents the legally recoverable obligation. Interest accounts for the period during which the claimant was deprived of that money.

A historical valuation rule therefore does not necessarily leave the claimant with only the original dollar amount after years of litigation. Where prejudgment interest is recoverable, the judgment includes compensation for the passage of time under the applicable interest rules.

That structure is central to understanding why a court can require historical pricing without treating delayed payment as economically irrelevant.

Interest compensates for delay without continually repricing the underlying loss

Consider a hypothetical claim in which the governing policy requires valuation at the time of loss. Assume the evidence establishes a covered repair amount of $100,000 at that time, while the same work would cost $140,000 several years later.

The existence of the $140,000 estimate does not itself establish that the insurer’s original obligation has become $140,000. The analysis begins with the amount payable under the policy’s valuation provisions, subject to the deductible, prior payments, and other applicable terms. Any entitlement to prejudgment interest is then calculated using the legally appropriate accrual date and rate.

This method treats the unpaid obligation as a monetary loss and compensates for the withholding of that money. It does not automatically recalculate the principal each time construction prices change.

The distinction also avoids allowing the trial calendar to select the damages measure. Where the obligation is fixed by an earlier valuation date, an adjournment of trial should not itself authorize a new principal amount merely because another price list has become available.

Prejudgment interest provides a legal mechanism for addressing delay while preserving the governing valuation standard.

There is, however, an economic limitation worth stating precisely. Interest does not necessarily equal the actual increase in the price of particular materials or trades. Construction inflation may exceed the applicable interest rate, or it may fall below it. The law’s compensation for the deprivation of money is not a guarantee that an award will track every change in the repair market.

Accordingly, it is more accurate to say that prejudgment interest compensates for delayed access to money than to say it necessarily reimburses every dollar of construction-cost escalation. The distinction does not diminish the importance of interest. It explains the function interest performs.

A claim for some additional recoverable loss requires its own contractual or legal foundation and supporting proof.

First-party property claims require attention to the policy’s valuation language

The connection between Bandklayder and first-party property litigation is substantial, but the claims are not identical.

Bandklayder concerned damages for breach of construction obligations. An insurance claim requires examination of the policy’s valuation and loss-settlement provisions, together with the governing law. The date of physical damage and the date of an insurer’s breach are distinct events.

Where a policy requires valuation at the time of loss, the damages presentation must address that requirement. A current estimate may describe the present market accurately without establishing the amount owed under that provision.

A federal decision directly addressed this issue in West 32nd/33rd Place Warehouse Condominium Association, Inc. v. Western World Insurance Co., No. 22-CV-21408, 2023 WL 3276658 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2023).

The property sustained damage in October 2019, but the insured’s repair figure used August 2022 labor and material prices. Reading the policy’s loss-payment and valuation provisions together, the court held that repair costs had to be calculated using prices at the time of loss. It granted the insurer partial summary judgment on that issue. West 32nd/33rd Place Warehouse Condominium Association, Inc. v. Western World Insurance Co., No. 22-CV-21408 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2023).

That ruling depended on the particular policy language. It illustrates why an updated price list cannot replace analysis of the insurer’s contractual obligation.

Replacement-cost benefits also require separate attention. Florida’s statutory framework can require additional payments as covered work is performed and expenses are incurred. The rights arising under those provisions must be analyzed rather than assumed to disappear under a general construction-contract rule. § 627.7011(3)(a), Fla. Stat.

The sound proposition is that subsequent price increases do not automatically change the measure of recovery. Counsel must identify what the policy and applicable law authorize, then present evidence satisfying that standard.

The interest accrual date must also be established

Just as the proper valuation date cannot be assumed, neither can the date from which interest begins.

In insurance litigation, the date of the casualty is not necessarily the date payment became contractually due. The policy’s payment provisions and the governing law may require a different accrual date.

In Sunshine State Insurance Co. v. Davide, 15 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), the Third District reversed an interest award calculated from the hurricane-loss date. The policy made the disputed amount payable sixty days after the filing of an appraisal award, and that payment provision controlled the interest analysis. Sunshine State Insurance Co. v. Davide, 15 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

A properly developed damages presentation should therefore establish both the recoverable principal and the basis for any interest calculation. Those components may involve different dates.

This is particularly useful in mediation. The amount claimed for the covered loss and the amount claimed as interest can be presented separately, with the legal basis for each. That approach makes clear how the demand accounts for delay without obscuring whether the underlying repair valuation satisfies the policy.

A newly prepared report can provide a historical valuation

Requiring evidence tied to the appropriate period does not necessarily require an expert report written during that period.

The date a report is prepared and the date it values are different. An expert retained years after the loss may develop a retrospective estimate using reliable historical information.

Depending on the circumstances, potentially relevant materials may include contemporaneous estimates, supplier information, invoices, historical cost data, and other evidence appropriate to the work and location. The expert must explain the basis for the calculation and any adjustments.

A generic reduction of a current estimate may not be sufficient. Different materials and trades can experience different price changes. The methodology must connect the selected information to the actual repair scope and relevant period.

The practical objective is to ensure that the evidence answers the question the court must decide. A detailed report can still leave that question unanswered if it addresses only current prices.

The homeowners did not receive another opportunity to prove damages

The consequence in Bandklayder extended beyond rejection of the 35% increase.

The homeowners asked the appellate court to allow further proceedings so they could establish damages as of the proper date. The Third District declined and directed entry of judgment for the developer.

The court relied on Levy v. Ben-Shmuel, 255 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (en banc), which explains that a party ordinarily does not receive another trial to cure its own failure to present sufficient damages evidence. A deficiency attributable to judicial error may justify different treatment, but the court found no such basis in Bandklayder. Levy v. Ben-Shmuel, 255 So. 3d 493, 495, 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (en banc).

The distinction is between correcting an error that prevented a proper presentation and allowing a party to rebuild an insufficient case after it has already been tried.

The homeowners had the burden of establishing their damages. Their success in persuading the trial judge to accept the later valuation did not relieve them of that burden or entitle them to reopen the evidence after reversal.

The court expressly reserved whether nominal damages might have been appropriate because neither party requested that remedy. Its actual disposition was reversal of the compensatory judgment and directions to enter judgment for the developer. Bandklayder, 406 So. 3d at 270 & n.4.

The lesson for claimants is consequential: omitting the correct damages evidence can jeopardize the entire recovery, rather than merely the disputed increase.

The existing record determines what remains possible after reversal

The rule against another opportunity to supply missing proof does not mean every erroneous damages award requires judgment for the defendant.

In Jeremy Stewart Construction, Inc. v. Matthews, 324 So. 3d 41, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021), the court rejected a construction-damages award based on trial-time conditions and costs. Because the existing record contained evidence supporting some damages at the time of breach, however, it remanded for a determination of the recoverable amount. Jeremy Stewart Construction, Inc. v. Matthews, 324 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).

By contrast, the Fourth District followed Bandklayder in Vuletic Group L.L.C. v. Malkin, 418 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). The homeowners terminated their remodeling contractor in November 2019 but presented repair-cost evidence using September 2022 prices. The court reversed the damages award and directed judgment for the contractor.

It also rejected the homeowners’ contention that the contractor bore the burden of proving their damages unreasonable. The homeowners first had to establish damages under the correct measure. Vuletic Group L.L.C. v. Malkin, 418 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).

Those decisions make the contents of the trial record decisive. Evidence supporting the proper measure may permit a further calculation. Its complete absence may leave no recoverable award to calculate.

Preparing a claim that accounts for both the loss and the delay

A property-damage presentation should address the governing valuation rule before the parties become committed to a particular estimate.

Counsel and the valuation professional should identify the relevant contractual provisions, determine the appropriate valuation date, and ensure that the estimate addresses that period. If another measure or an additional category of recovery is asserted, its legal basis and supporting evidence should be developed separately.

Prejudgment interest should receive the same attention. The claimed principal, accrual date, applicable rate, and effect of prior payments should be addressed in a calculation that can be explained and supported.

This approach recognizes both sides of the claimant’s economic concern: the amount originally owed and the consequences of receiving it late. It also allows a client to understand why an estimate based solely on current construction prices may present a serious litigation risk.

Bandklayder demonstrates that proof of higher prices does not substitute for proof under the governing damages standard. Prejudgment interest, where recoverable, supplies the established means of compensating for the deprivation of money during the intervening period. The claimant’s task is to establish both components correctly before the opportunity to present evidence has passed.